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I. INTRODUCTION 
The farmer, in his role as manager of an economic enterprise, has 
two distinct functions to perform. The first is one of "organization", 
and entails the initial identification of the firm's goals and the subse­
quent formulation of the means to be applied in attempting to attain these 
desired ends. The selection of the farm's production policy and methods, 
the choice of types and scale of enterprises, and decisions on resource 
use patterns, all constitute important aspects of organizational activity. 
Added to this is the necessity of adjusting production plans in response 
to changing technical and economic influences, and maintaining over time 
a production pattern consistent with the desired goals and the production 
environment. 
A second function of management is that of "supervision", or the 
execution of the organizational policy. Under this heading would fall 
those activities in the day-to-day operation of a farm whereby the produc­
tion plans are carried out, the resources applied and the output achieved. 
Of course, even the supervisory function involves planning and the making 
of adjustments on a small scale (for example, the planning of the day's 
work ahead and the adjustment of activities with respect to the current 
weather conditions). But in general the differentiation of two distinct 
classes of activity in management is a valid and convenient one. 
In a large industrial enterprise, such a division of management is 
an obvious one; whereas in agriculture the two functions are generally 
vested in one individual, the farmer, who serves as his own organizer and 
supervisor. The two functions are integral parts of the management 
process, and the one cannot be complete without the other. However, the 
relative importance of the two aspects can differ depending upon the type 
of agriculture practiced. 
In subsistence agriculture, for example, the supervisory function is 
perhaps the more important. The production pattern is generally fixed by 
tradition or convention, having evolved over a long period of time; and in 
an underdeveloped economy very little in the way of changing technical or 
economic influences exerts a pressure for adjustment of production plans. 
The primary emphasis is on managing the crop and livestock enterprises in 
the routine way in order to achieve the subsistence level of output in the 
face of weather and disease factors. As an economy develops however, and 
agriculture's contact with competing sectors of the domestic and foreign 
economies increases, the organizational function of management assumes 
greater importance relative to the supervisory function. Finally a stage 
is reached where, as in the United States, technological and economic 
change is ever present and efficient production requires constant adjustment 
of production methods and plans in the face of dynamic price and technical 
conditions. 
Under such conditions the farmer is faced with great uncertainties 
with respect to both the physical and the economic relationships in his 
production process. His ability to combat this uncertainty and achieve the 
goals he has set for himself will depend to a large extent on his ability 
to make the right decisions in planning and production. Although unable 
to eliminate or become immune to the uncertainty with which he must con­
tend, the farmer can adopt certain measures to minimize its adverse 
effects. 
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This study is primarily concerned with one of these measures, that of 
applying a logical and systematic method for selecting an appropriate 
course of action in situations where the final outcome cannot be foreseen 
with certainty. In the following pages the organizational function of 
management will be examined and the central importance of decision making 
will be pointed out. This decision making process will then be examined 
in greater detail, and the environment of uncertainty and imperfect knowl­
edge within which it must take place will be discussed. Before closing 
the theoretical portion of this study, consideration will be given to the 
different ways in which a farmer might react to uncertainty. 
In the empirical chapters, an analysis is made of an approach to 
decision making under uncertainty by means of the application of game 
theoretic procedures to a simplified representation of the decision prob­
lem. Examples of uncertainty with respect to both physical relationships 
and economic relationships in agricultural production are shown, and 
actual decisions made by Iowa farmers are compared with the theoretically 
derived optima. It is suggested that a simplified analysis of a decision 
problem as illustrated here is a useful device which can be used on the 
farm level, enabling a farmer to elucidate the major factors from the 
whole spectrum of uncertainty, and within this framework to chart his 
optimal path with respect to the ends he has in mind. 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
(a) To examine the impact of .uncertainty on farm management 
(b) To explain the basic principles of decision making under uncertainty, 
with special reference to the theory of two-person zero-sum games 
(c) To demonstrate the structuring of an agricultural decision problem 
in the form of a simple game against Nature. 
(d) To illustrate the selection of optimal farmer decisions within such 
a game framework, using examples of realistic farmer problems 
(e) For certain given situations, to compare some actual farmer decisions 
with those decisions which, on theoretical considerations, are con­
ceived to be optimal within each situation. 
It is hoped that this study will shed some light upon how farmer 
decisions are actually made, and upon how some of the problems associated 
with selecting the most desirable action in the face of uncertain outcomes 
may be eased. The improvement of farmer decision making is one most useful 
means towards achieving better farm management; and advances in the tech­
nique of management must be a primary objective in the nationally important 
problem of the efficient allocation and use of available resources. 
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II. THE MANAGERIAL FUNCTION 
The bipartite nature of management has been recognized, and the organ­
izational function has been emphasized as being of major importance in a 
developed agriculture. This function will now be discussed in greater 
detail. 
Several writers have examined the organizing and coordinating function 
of management and have sub-divided it into several component parts. Heady 
(22, p. 466) has emphasized that the necessity for the management process 
grows out of the dynamic conditions of change and imperfect knowledge con­
cerning the course of future events. Consequently, one of the first tasks 
of the manager is the formulation of expectations of conditions which will 
prevail in the future. This involves attempts at predicting or antici­
pating future price movements and levels, possible weather conditions and 
production rates, and arriving at expected values of these variables which 
may be used in production planning. Secondly, plans of production must 
be made on the basis of the established expectations, considering different 
possible enterprises, resource use patterns, and the intensity and scale 
of production. Such plans should be consistent with the goals of the 
farmer, his resource position and his expectations of the future. The 
third crucial step is the decision as to the exact plan or mode of action 
to be selected from amongst the alternatives available to the farmer, and 
following this decision the chosen plan must finally be put into effect. 
An auxiliary responsibility of management is to accept the economic conse­
quences of the decisions made, whether they be good or bad; ex ante, an 
inability to do this may impede the making of decisions where the outcomes 
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are uncertain. 
The above functions of management are not relevant only during the 
planning stage. Throughout the production process, expectations may need 
to be revised in response to changing conditions, production plans may 
need adjusting in the light of current experience, and a further set of 
decisions made and actions taken to maintain production along desirable 
lines. 
Johnson and Haver (31) have given a rather similar categorization 
of the functions of management as it is considered here. They identify 
five tasks which they place under the headings of: observation, analysis, 
decision making, action taking, and the acceptance of economic responsi­
bility. 
Nielson (41) was somewhat more exhaustive in delineating specific 
aspects or processes of farm management, and included the following eight 
classes of activities: 
(a) The formulation of the goals or objectives of the firm 
(b) The recognition and definition of a problem, or the recognition of 
an opportunity 
(c) Obtaining information and observation of the relevant facts 
(d) The specification of and analysis of alternatives 
(e) Decision making-selecting an alternative 
(f) Taking action, or the implementation of the alternative selected 
(assuming that the decision was to take action) 
(g) Bearing responsibility for the decision or action taken 
(h) Evaluating the outcome. 
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Such a breakdown of management into its component parts, while appear­
ing to be purely definitional, is a useful one for purposes of study and 
analysis. Too, Nielsen's contention is that empirical research tends to 
confirm that farm managers do actually perform most of the functions as 
they are here represented. 
From the above breakdown, it can be seen that the decision making 
activity is the central one in the series of management tasks ; or, to use 
Nielson's phraseology, it is "the core of the management process". All 
other activities of the manager may be considered as being subordinate to 
decision making ; for they are either undertaken in the preparation of a 
decision making situation, or are dependent upon a decision being made. 
Decisions can conceivably be made without all of the other tasks being 
undertaken, but on the other hand those activities would be but pointless 
exercises were a decision not either contemplated or executed. Thus, the 
decision making activity can stand as the focal point in the farm manage­
ment process, and indeed, Simon (55) uses the terms "decision making" and 
"management" as though they were synonymous. 
In his analysis, Simon (55, p. 2), considers the decision making 
process to consist of the following three phases: 
(a) "Intelligence activity", being the process of searching for a situa­
tion or conditions which require the making of a decision. 
(b) "Design activity", in which the manager develops and analyzes possible 
courses of action to be applied in resolving the situation. 
(c) "Choice activity", wherein a particular course of action is selected 
from those available. 
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The above phases are closely related to the stages in problem solving 
first described by Dewey (13, Chapter 8) and represent a logical and detail­
ed exposition of a process which is often conducted merely at the level of 
the subconscious. 
The three steps in decision making that Simon identifies are roughly 
similar to the simple breakdown of the whole management function as 
considered earlier, and they serve to further illuminate the position of 
central importance that the making of decisions has in managerial activity. 
The next chapter will delve somewhat deeper into this one aspect of 
management. 
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III. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
The decisions that must be made on a farm vary considerably in the 
ease with which they may be made* their implications on the success of 
the business, and the procedures which need to be used in arriving at the 
final choice. Simon (55, p. 5) elects to distinguish two polar types of 
decision which a manager might face, the distinction being based upon the 
way in which the decision can be handled. The first type he calls "program­
med decisions", and these constitute those repetitive and routine decisions 
(generally having short run consequences) for which a definite procedure 
or rule of thumb may be used in arriving at the final choice. "Non-pro­
grammed decisions", on the other hand, are those required in situations 
which are novel, unique or rare in the manager's experience. Generally 
speaking such decisions are of longer run significance to the business and 
there will be no ready made method available for handling the problem. 
In a farmer's situation, examples of programmed decisions readily 
come to mind; the exact timing of certain farm activities such as corn 
planting or buying and selling hogs, or the question of whether to borrow 
more money, are all amenable to techniques of programmed decision making. 
The later empirical sections of this study will illustrate the application 
of game theoretic principles as a useful procedure in making decisions of 
the programmed variety. Non-programmed decisions in farming do not arise 
so frequently, and would be concerned with situations which are perhaps 
more intimately related with the farmer's value system. As examples one 
might cite the decision to change farms, to buy or rent a farm or even 
whether to leave farming altogether. 
The above bisection of decision making activity is necessarily an 
arbitrary one, and farmer decisions will not fall neatly into one or the 
other category. In practice a whole continuum of decisions exists with 
strictly programmed and strictly non-programmed ones being the extremes, 
and many "shades of gray" in between. Such a division, however, is a use­
ful step in a logical and methodical analysis of the decision process and 
as an aid in identifying the main elements in decision making activity. 
As a further step in analysis, it would perhaps be instructive to 
examine the components that go to make up a decision situation. 
A. The Characterization of a Decision Problem 
It has been stated by Taylor (57) that any simple decision situation 
requires three things. These are (a) an actor, who reacts to (b) certain* 
unstable external phenomena or conditions in attempting to produce (c) 
certain desired consequences. This is merely a more formal way of stating 
the common situation wherein a decision maker chooses from among the 
alternatives open to him in the hope of achieving some desired objective. 
However, the identification of the main components of a subject is perhaps 
the best initial step in a methodical analysis of that subject, and this 
procedure can be logically applied to any problem that faces a decision 
maker in a decision situation. 
A generalized structure of a decision problem has been well set out 
by Hildreth (27) and the following discussion will follow along his lines. 
*The word "certain" is used here not in the sense of the antonym of 
"uncertain", but rather having the more general meaning of "particular" 
or "specified". 
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This outline is broad enough to cover many instances, whether in an empir­
ical or theoretical context, whether under conditions of certainty or 
uncertainty. It is thus well suited to characterizing decision situations 
in which farmers may find themselves. 
The relevant parts of a decision problem are sets of possible events, 
actions, strategies, and consequences ; also, a criterion for ordering the 
consequences and a function assigning a consequence to each pair consisting 
of an action and an event. 
An event Sj of the set of possible events S (written, Sj • S) is a 
circumstance or combination of circumstances relevant to the decision 
maker's welfare and behavior but outside his control. For example, the 
occurrence of a certain set of prices or weather phenomena are events of 
importance to the farmer in his planning. 
An action A^ of the set of possible actions A (that is, A^4B A) is 
one of the series of alternatives that a farmer can select that will lead 
him into a post-decision state for this situation. The application of a 
certain resource mix or input level, the buying of a piece of machinery, 
or placing a certain field in the Soil Bank constitute farmer actions, 
each being one of a particular set of alternatives. 
A consequence C^j is the resulting outcome of a farmer's action con­
ditioned by the occurrence of a particular event; the net revenue resulting 
from a choice of inputs and the actual weather and prices is a consequence 
of major significance in most instances. To illustrate its functional 
dependence upon actions and events, a consequence may be denoted by 
Gij = 1 <Ai»Sj) 
8 then being the function assigning a consequence to each pair consisting 
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of an action and an event. 
A strategy, a, is a function that designates an action corresponding 
to any selected event and is thus a way of reacting to events in one's 
environment. In this sense, a strategy may be denoted as 
A^ = or (Sj) 
In decision making under certainty (the particular Sj occurring is 
known in advance), the distinction between action and strategy vanishes. 
Considering the final part of a generalized decision problem, it,is 
assumed that there is some natural way to order the consequences, or at 
least to obtain a partial ordering. That is to say, of any pair of con­
sequences (C,C*) it is possible to say that C is better than (preferred to) 
C*, or that C* is better than C, or that neither one is preferred to the 
other. Within this framework then, the decision problem is to order the 
strategies or select an optimal strategy in a fashion that reasonably re­
flects the given ordering of consequences. 
In problems involving certainty there should be no difficulty about 
this. Each strategy (or action) is associated with a known consequence, 
and ceteris paribus one strategy is better if its consequence is better. 
Thus, certainty problems are trivial as far as the central issue of deci­
sion theory is concerned. 
Frequently, consequences are ordered by a real valued function, the 
value taken by the function being interpreted as something like net reve­
nue, negative cost, utility or expected utility. Such a function will 
be called a criterion, and is assumed to exist in the cases considered in 
this study. 
To illustrate some of these remarks one could take a situation in the 
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production of an agricultural product. A is the set of alternative non-
negative input combinations, S is the set of possible production functions, 
and[C^j ]is the matrix of resulting input-output combinations. The criter­
ion in this case could be the equation for net revenue; (or a more complete 
interpretation might be to say that the criterion is a utility function 
and that, if utility is assumed to increase strictly monotonically with 
net revenue, actions or strategies may be ordered by either.) In the later 
empirical sections of this study, a type of game theoretic approach (see 
Chapter VI) will be applied to decision problems under conditions where 
ex ante the specific consequence resulting from a given action is uncertain 
because the specific event which will occur is unknown. 
B. The Nature of the Decision Maker 
The lives of all men include a continuous series of decisions. Many 
of these are unimportant, the outcome of the decision having almost no 
significance to the decision maker's destiny; he can allow whim, fancy or 
purely random influences to guide his choice. Such trivial situations are 
not of interest here. But many decisions must be made which do not fall 
in this category. They do not represent mere simple idle choices but will 
have outcomes which will at least be noticeable to the decision maker, and 
often have a significant effect upon his success. Under such circumstances, 
it is instructive to inquire into those characteristics of the decision 
maker that will influence his final decision. At this point, the litera­
ture commonly considers what the characteristics of the decision maker 
should be, rather than what they actually are. This is because theories 
of decision are mostly idealized normative theories, and their conclusions 
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are based on the satisfaction of various normative assumptions, especially 
the assumption of rationality. Even descriptive decision theories (such 
as those of Shackle (48) and Simon (54)) assume the actions of the indiv­
idual are in some sense rational. That this assumption should be made is 
not unreasonable, since, as Thomas (59, p. 1115) states, "the making of 
decisions implies the existence of objectives toward which decisions are 
oriented". If this is true and the objectives are meaningful, then the 
decision maker will presumably be able to more closely approximate the 
attainment of these objectives if his actions are not irrational and hap­
hazard . 
Katona (33, p. 49) describes rational behavior as the weighing of 
different alternative courses of action and choosing deliberately from 
among them, according to some principle. To be more specific, the simplest 
requirements of rational decision are that (a) the set of possible outcomes 
can be (at least weakly) ordered according to preference, and (b) that the 
final choice among alternatives is made in order to maximize some index 
(17). 
The preference ordering of outcomes reflects their relative desirabil­
ity or undesirability in terms of the index to be maximized. In order to 
formulate such a preference ranking the decision maker must be able to 
make, for each possible pairing of outcomes[A,B], one of the following 
statements : 
(a) A is preferred to B, or 
(b) B is preferred to A, or 
(c) A is not preferred to B, nor is B preferred to A — i.e. he is indif­
ferent between them. 
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For a valid ordering another condition, that of transitivity, must 
hold. This means that in the ranking of any three outcomes A, B, and 
C, if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A must be preferred 
to C. If the transitivity condition is not fulfilled within the relevant 
range of outcomes, and hence circularities exist in the preference order­
ing, no meaningful progress may be made towards selecting the optimal 
decision or maximizing the preference index. 
The concept of maximization is a fundamental one in the theory of 
decision, but exactly what is to be maximized is not always immediately 
obvious. In situations where decisions are made under certainty the indiv­
idual is assumed to maximize "utility", while if outcomes are uncertain 
then it is "expected utility", which is maximized. Despite certain con­
temporary claims to the contrary (for example: (63, pp. 15-31)), utility 
is not universally held as a very measurable quantity; and for practical 
purposes the maximization of money income (or expected money income) is 
generally taken as the operational variable (52). This method of circum­
venting the problem of utility identification and measurement is based on 
the assumption that economic gain serves as an intermediate end in human 
activity; then, maximizing this intermediate end implies maximizing the 
means of attaining the higher order ends represented by the term "utility", 
which can then remain unspecified (53, p. 5). The adoption of this 
approach seems reasonable as long as the intermediate, economic goal is 
compatible with the ultimate end. 
In order to present or test theories of decision making, it is obvious­
ly desirable to assume that human beings, not being totally irresponsible 
in their every action, do display some consistency or pattern of approach 
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in their behavior when faced with a decision situation. But if Homo 
sapiens as a species is rational in outlook, there is some doubt whether 
any individual is, or indeed can be, completely rational in all his actions. 
Very often the assumptions of rationality, even in their simplest form as 
expressed above, seem to be at variance with observed behavior. Schoeffler 
(47) has examined at great length the theoretical requirements for rational 
action, and infers that the criteria for absolute rationality are so 
strict that one could not possibly satisfy all of them. He concludes, 
however, that for practical rationality it is sufficient that a decision 
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maker's actions tend towards the desirable norm. Simon (53) recognizes 
the practical difficulties involved for the individual in formulating the 
required preference ordering of outcomes, because of the impossibility of 
knowing all the alternatives facing him or all the possible consequences 
of his actions; and this impossibility represents an important departure, 
from the model of objective rationality. Simon states (53, p. 79): 
"It is impossible for the behavior of a single isolated indiv­
idual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of 
alternatives he must explore is so great, the information he 
would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation 
to objective rationality is hard to conceive." 
Actual behavior falls short of objective rationality in at least 
three ways (53, p. 81): 
(a) Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the 
consequences that will follow on each choice. In fact, knowledge of 
consequences is always fragmentary. 
(b) Since these consequences lie in the future, imagination must supply 
the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them; but 
values can be only imperfectly anticipated. 
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(c) Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behav­
iors. In actual behavior, only a very few of all these possible 
alternatives ever come to mind. 
Thus, for practical purposes, somewhat less than the theoretical ideal in 
rationality must be accepted. This "working rationality" must concede 
that the individual may simplify his choice problem to a manageable level 
in terms of alternatives and consequences considered, and then within this 
framework and the limits of his knowledge the decision maker will satisfy 
the conditions of preference ordering and maximization behavior. (That 
this point is accepted is important to the later sections of this study, 
where decision problems will be grossly simplified in an attempt to come 
closer to an optimum decision under uncertainty). 
In an effort to prevent misinterpretation of the term rationality, 
Simon (53, p. 76) suggests that it be qualified by the use of an appropri­
ate adverb. Thus a decision.is "objectively" rational if it is in fact 
the correct behavior for maximizing given values in a given situation; it 
is "subjectively" rational if it maximizes attainment relative to the 
actual knowledge of the subject. Similarly, decisions are "consciously" 
or "deliberately" rational to the degree that the adjustment of means to 
ends is a conscious process or is deliberately brought about, and it may 
be said to be "personally" rational if it is oriented to the individual's 
goals. Other qualifications can be added for a specific context. 
Given that the simplification of a problem down to "plausible" 
alternatives is still rational, one may question whether individuals 
satisfy the other general rationality assumptions. May (39) has questioned 
the possibility of ordering preferences without violating the transitivity 
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conditions, although Papandreou (42) found no experimental evidence that 
this condition was not being met. If a satisfactory ordering of prefer­
ences is unobtainable over a certain group of outcomes, this is presumably 
because the individual's preference function is not sufficiently well 
defined to eludicate small negative or positive preference differentials 
between close alternatives. Decision making in this case would not be 
"objectively rational" where preferences show circularities; but since 
small differences in preferences cannot be precisely detected, then the 
effects of taking the "objectively wrong" decision would not be noticeable 
to the decision maker. No dissonance is caused whichever one of the 
alternatives corresponding to the intransitive preferences is selected --
thus the decision maker may still be "subjectively rational" within this 
framework of imperfect knowledge (of his preferences). The point is that 
the decision maker must not be adjudged irrational because his actions 
do not satisfy the axioms of some lofty theorist, but only if he is 
knowingly causing himself dissonance in his actions and takes no steps to 
remedy this. 
This leads to the consideration of whether decision makers are in 
fact also maximizers, or whether they are more complacent than this. 
Churchman (8, p. 44) has stated that it is often bad policy to attribute 
solely optimizing objectives to a decision maker,. Rather, he should be 
conceived of as a learner attempting to improve his choices. This sug­
gests a close association between decision theory and learning theory. 
Intuitively it would appear that human beings, both individually and in 
aggregate, are motivated by maximizing desires; the main difficulty for 
an observer is to identify the variable which is maximized, whether it 
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be economic gain, security, prestige, happiness or some more obscure 
personal desire. By convention, all these possibilities are conveniently 
included in the melting pot of the term "utility". 
It is not at all clear that decision makers attempt to maximize 
expected profit, or minimize expected costs in risk-taking situations. 
Several sets of experimental results (11, 40) tend to show this sort of 
"irrationality", though the artificiality of the experimental situations 
may have had some bearing on the subjects' responses (44, p. 81). Also, 
the famous St. Petersburg paradox (38, p. 20) illustrated that expected 
money values did not always constitute a relevant maximizing index for 
gambling (risk-taking) situations. The rationale generally given for 
using expected values involves an argument as to what will happen in the 
long run when the decision situation is faced a repeated number of times. 
But it is by no means clear that an expected value is relevant to the 
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individual whose decision is made but once — a feature which stimulated 
Shackle (48) to propose his own special theory of decision. Alchian (1) 
argues that the use of an expected value completely begs the question of 
uncertainty by disregarding the variance of the distribution of outcomes, 
while a certainty equivalent assumes the answer. He sees the problem of 
the decision maker as the choice of an optimum distribution, since there 
is no such thing as a maximizing distribution. Alchian's conclusion is 
that, where outcomes are uncertain, one cannot logically even attempt to 
maximize profits or utility in an ex ante sense. 
Further objections against outright maximizing behavior have been 
lodged by Simon (54, Chapter 14) who puts forward a plausible argument 
for considering the decision maker to be a "satisficer", seeking merely 
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to achieve some (sub-maximum) "aspiration level" which to him is suffici­
ently satisfactory. Flood (18) found behavior in experimental subjects 
which could be interpreted as being of a satisficing rather than maximizing 
nature. 
That the theory of decision making is not yet "cut and dried" should 
be obvious from the above discussion. As will be seen in Chapter VI, 
some decision models are normative while others are purely descriptive in 
nature; but all subsume some kind of rationality in behavior with respect 
to choosing among alternatives in striving for a particular level of 
desirability of outcome. 
For the purposes of this study, it need only be assumed that farmers 
can specify for consideration merely the more important alternative actions 
and events they face, and that their decisions are directed towards the 
attainment of particular objectives which can be specified in (or have 
a counterpart in) monetary returns. 
IV. THE DECISION MAKING ENVIRONMENT 
The main conditioning influence on the efficacy of decisions is the 
environment, an environment of imperfect knowledge within which a decision 
is made. This factor lies basically at the back of the conservative 
psychologies, the "shot-in-the-dark" behavior and the sub-optimal decisions 
which often characterize many decision makers. As already mentioned, 
imperfect knowledge with respect to the alternative courses of action open 
to him is one reason why an individual cannot act completely rationally 
in the objective sense. But even if he were aware of and considered all 
his alternatives, the decision maker's "best" alternative is no more 
obvious because the occurrence of the specific event which (along with his 
action) determines the outcome cannot be accurately predicted. Such an 
uncertainty situation is very prevalent in agricultural production where, 
by virtue of its biological nature (as opposed to the more mechanical and 
controlled production processes of industry) the effects of input factors 
cannot be precisely controlled and can only be predicted within a range 
of values. The result of such technical variability on agriculture as a 
whole is to cause inter-year or inter-period output fluctuations and thus 
helping to create conditions of price uncertainty for the farmer. Because 
of his limited ability to control such uncertain phenomena as weather, 
disease occurrence, price level and movements, etc., a farmer finds it 
virtually impossible to make his ex ante decisions in such a way that ex 
post, his objectives will be precisely attained. The object of this study 
is to illustrate how in such situations, he can make the best use of the 
knowledge he does have in an attempt to approach the attainment of these 
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objectives more closely. 
"Uncertainty" as used above is merely a general term used to indicate 
a state of imperfect knowledge. This concept has been formalized and dif­
ferent classifications describing states of knowledge have been developed 
by several writers. 
One well known division of states of knowledge is that due to Knight 
(36), based upon whether the events of interest can be characterized by 
a probability distribution. His certainty situation holds when each 
action is known to lead invariably to a specific outcome. This is the 
situation of perfect knowledge assumed in static economic theory. A risk 
environment is one in which the events are members of a probability distri­
bution of which the parameters are known with certainty. Certainty is 
thus a degenerate case of risk where the relevant probabilities are one 
or zero. Uncertainty is the state of knowledge where the probability of 
an outcome cannot be established in an empirical or quantitative sense, 
a situation in which farmers normally find themselves. Risk is thus insur­
able in an actuarial sense, uncertainty is not. 
Hart (21) felt this classification to be inadequate because the dis­
tinctions were made on the basis of the possibility of determining objec­
tive probabilities. He felt it more realistic to consider the subjective 
position of the manager with respect to the knowledge he actually posses­
sed, (as opposed to the information that was available). 
Reasoning along similar lines, Tintner (62) considered the relevant 
states of knowledge to be: (a) subjective certainty if anticipations were 
considered to be single valued, (b) subjective risk if a probability 
distribution of outcomes was held with certainty, and (c) subjective 
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uncertainty if distribution of the anticipations was itself thought to be 
a member of a probability distribution. This satisfied the notion that 
the uncertainty in a situation is a subjective phenomenon peculiar to the 
mind of the individual, his psychology and his outlook. This fact was 
again emphasized by Arrow (2) and is important to a study of decision mak­
ing. Thus, if two persons ponder on the occurrence of a future event, one 
may consider it to be highly certain while the other may regard it as most 
uncertain; the event itself does not specify the amount of uncertainty 
involved. 
Heady (23) has well summed up the different degrees of imperfect 
knowledge and related them to their underlying cause, the dynamic condi­
tions of change over time, (a) Change does not take place, or change 
occurs but each outcome can be perfectly predicted; this represents a 
certainty state of knowledge. (b) Change takes place and although specific 
outcomes are unpredictable, an expected value and confidence interval can 
be empirically specified; this is risk as Knight saw it. (c) Empirical 
prediction of distributions and parameters of change is impossible; sub­
jective prediction is here the only means available and outcomes may be 
thought to be included in some objectively unknown distribution (Knight's 
uncertainty or Tintner1 s subjective risk) or distribution of distributions 
(Tintner's subjective uncertainty). Using ideas put forward by Wald (65) 
concerning the sequential process of collecting information and continually 
appraising it to determine whether available knowledge warranted the making 
of a decision to act or to await further information, and Hart's (21) 
comments on the subjectivity of states of knowledge, Johnson and Haver (31) 
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distinguished five different states of knowledge with which a manager 
might identify his position. These are: 
(a) Subjective certainty, or the conviction that knowledge is perfect 
(b) Subjective uncertainty, in which state the manager recognizes his 
knowledge is not perfect. He may consider himself to be in one of 
the following component sub-situations. 
(i) "Risk action" is the case where the manager realizes his 
knowledge is not sufficient to allow his making an errorless 
decision, but nonetheless he is "willing to risk it" and 
accept the chances of being wrong. He may take precautions 
against this risk, perhaps by using formal or informal 
insurance measures. 
(ii) The "learning" situation occurs when a manager has insuf­
ficient knowledge about a contemplated action, but is pre­
pared to seek further information to help in making his 
decision. 
(iii) An "inaction" state exists when the manager knows too 
little about a possible course of action and does not 
consider it worth while trying to obtain the necessary 
information. 
(iv) "Forced action" is a case in which the decision maker feels 
compelled to take an action although his knowledge of the 
consequences is insufficient, and he would prefer to delay 
his action until he has more information. 
This seems to be a reasonable and logical breakdown of knowledge situations 
in which farmers may find themselves when faced with a decision. It should 
25 
perhaps be noted that any one of the above states would not characterize 
a farmer in all his actions. Possibly, faced with five decisions, he 
might consider himself to be in a different one of the above knowledge 
situations with respect to each decision. 
On the basis of a limited survey Johnson (29) claimed that farmers 
recognized the distinction between the different uncertainty states from 
their own experience, thus adding some evidence as to the realism of the 
classification. 
Although it has become conventional to consider actions under imper­
fect knowledge in terms of probabilities and distributions, risk and 
uncertainty, some writers have not fully accepted this approach. Shackle 
rejects the usefulness of considering probabilities in those decision 
situations which are faced but infrequently. He asserts that (48, p. 6) 
"actuarial general principles and particular facts" are of help only if: 
(a) one is sure that the system observed now and in the past will remain 
unchanged in the future; (b) one is interested in the average outcome of a 
series of decisions on the same problem; (c) there is assurance of having 
the opportunity to make the same decision many times. Thus according to 
this, a farmer would often be deluding himself in thinking that the 
expected value of the distribution of potential outcomes is relevant to 
the decision he is about to make. However, Shackle (50, p. 103) feels 
that 
"possibility is an entirely different idea from probability and it 
is sometimes.(we maintain) a more efficient and powerful uncertainty 
variable." 
It was on the basis of such reasoning that Shackle developed his theory 
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of decision making, which will be encountered in Chapter VI.. 
In summary it may be said that the vast majority of farming decisions 
are made under conditions where knowledge is imperfect; and the degree 
of imperfection in knowledge may range from an inability to predict merely 
a specific outcome to the state where no characteristics of the future 
can be conceived of at all. To the extent that the level of imperfection 
of this knowledge is subjectively determined by the decision maker, there 
is no "best" method of approach which is generally applicable to a given 
decision situation. The individual will decide, on the basis of his 
appraisal of the adequacy of his knowledge, which action he will take. 
Thus many different ways of reacting to the uncertainty in agricultural 
production may be adopted. The next chapter will include a consideration 
of some of these. 
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V. METHODS OF REACTING TO UNCERTAINTY 
Agricultural production continues in an environment of uncertainty; 
and in order that their imperfect knowledge does not become too burdensome 
it is perhaps obvious that farmers should take some measures to either 
reduce the level of their uncertainty or minimize its effects upon them 
as much as is possible. Certain of the measures that farmers may or do 
employ are examined in the following pages. 
A. Organizational Methods 
The dynamic conditions of agriculture give rise to fluctuations in 
outputs and in prices, with the consequence that the incomes from individ­
ual farms may vary widely from year to year. Such income variation is 
both inconvenient and disturbing to most farmers ; so in an attempt to 
minimize this they may organize or plan their operations in such ways as 
to make them less susceptible to the vagaries of uncontrollable forces. 
In effect, these would be measures to reduce the uncertainty regarding 
future income. Only a brief review will be given here, as the subject 
has been well covered elsewhere in the literature (22, Chapter 17). 
It is well known that some enterprises on a farm are more "risky" 
than others — for example, the variance of incomes in cattle feeding is 
known to be far higher than in dairying (6). Thus, one means to reduce 
uncertainty where a livestock enterprise is contemplated would be to 
engage in dairying. Similarly, the choice of corn rather than oats would 
tend to yield a more stable income from crop production in Iowa (26). 
In general, income levels may be stabilized by selecting those enterprises 
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exhibiting low variability of returns. 
Disregarding a general depression, it is unusual for returns from 
all farm enterprises to be low in any one year. This suggests that income 
uncertainty may be reduced by planning the farm to produce several dif­
ferent products. Diversification in this way is not to exploit comple­
mentary relationships but is purely an income stabilizing measure. The 
better ways to diversify are: (a) to combine enterprises in which the 
returns are negatively correlated; (b) to combine enterprises having low 
income variance with more profitable ones having higher variance; (c) to 
increase resource use by adding enterprises with (preferably) both lower 
variance and low correlation with present enterprises. 
Maintaining flexibility of the farm production structure is another 
useful uncertainty precaution. If the farmer feels unable to predict the 
future fortunes of his present enterprises, then flexibility will allow 
him to make necessary adjustments more easily as and if they become nec­
essary. By contrast, a more specialized and inflexible production struc­
ture may necessitate a far higher investment and cost in adjusting 
production towards the more favorable products after a change in the 
income situation of a particular enterprise. 
Another uncertainty precaution somewhat similar to flexibility is 
preserving liquidity in the farm's asset structure — that is, maintaining 
flexibility with respect to the form of assets. Liquidity reserves for 
the farmer the ability to survive unfavorable economic developments by 
converting liquid assets into funds for family living and necessary fixed 
outlays. It also gives him the opportunity of changing plans to take 
advantage of unexpected profitable alternatives. Closely related to a 
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preference for liquidity is the phenomenon of capital rationing. Because 
of the "increasing risk principle" (32, pp. 96-106) farmers may prefer to 
maintain a high equity ratio and thus they subject themselves to "internal" 
capital rationing. The uncertainty of returns from investment causes 
them to refrain from borrowing further capital, and they thus prevent the 
risks of losing their own capital from reaching too high a level. 
In order to make allowance for the imperfection of his knowledge in 
planning his production, a farmer may discount the expected values of 
yields and prices by an amount which reflects his "degree of belief" in 
these estimates. His plans would then be laid on the basis of these re­
duced values. Such discounting is a function of uncertainty rather than 
time, and is intended to protect the decision maker against serious losses; 
it implies conservatism and pessimism with respect to the future. 
Where such arrangements can be made, a farmer may reduce his uncer­
tainty by taking out formal insurance against particular occurrences. 
However, thé applicability of this means is limited in scope, and insur­
ance is not available to meet the more important uncertainties inherent 
in agriculture. Forward contracts represent another kind of insurance 
whereby the risk of unfavorable events may be shared with other individuals 
willing or able to bear it. Finally, one rather unambitious way to react 
to uncertainty is to select what appears to be a good overall production 
plan and then adhere to it over time. An action such as this may char­
acterize a farmer who feels that the future is so unpredictable that he 
has no confidence in his powers to anticipate and adjust to possible 
changes. 
From the above consideration of measures for adjusting the farm to 
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the uncertainty of future events, it is obvious that this cannot be accom­
plished without incurring some cost. Generally, speaking, the methods 
discussed are means of guaranteeing the survival of the firm in the short 
run in the face of imperfectly predictable occurrences. Most of the 
methods employed involve foregoing the opportunity of reaping large gains 
which may frequently occur, in favor of avoiding the possibility of large 
losses. Maximization of income over the long run is not attained, but 
rather a lower level of income which is subject to less year-to-year 
variation. Uncertainty in the decision making environment leads to ex post 
inefficiencies in resource use because many wrong decisions are made due 
to inaccurate anticipations of the future. Under the organizational meth­
ods discussed above, ex ante inefficiencies in resource use are perpe­
trated, and intentionally so; these reactions to uncertainty are examples 
of planned sub-optimization. Whether the losses to society from such 
intentional sub-optimum allocations of resources are greater than the los­
ses due to inefficiencies arising out of ex post incorrect decisions depends 
on the quality of the decision making, and upon how close managers can 
come to achieving an optimum decision for a given situation. This in turn 
depends upon the extent to which the future can be accurately predicted, 
and how intelligently these expectations are used in arriving at the final 
decision. It is with these questions that the rest of this chapter is 
concerned. 
B. Certainty Equivalent Methods 
The organizational factors discussed above are employed as means for 
"living with uncertainty"; given that knowledge of the environment is 
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imperfect the farmer can structure his operations in order to make himself 
less prone to wide fluctuations in income, or to guarantee himself some 
minimum income level. A further general method of reacting to uncertainty 
is to attempt to reduce the imperfection of knowledge rather than accepting 
it as such. These attempts are mainly concerned with venturing to predict 
the course of future events using information available from past experi­
ence. Past yields and prices, their trends and distributions are used 
within a framework of so-called "expectation models" in order to arrive 
at expected values for these variables which are anticipated to hold in 
the future ahead. For purposes of planning these values are then used 
as though they were certain. This does not mean that the farmer feels his 
predictions are one hundred percent accurate, but rather that these esti­
mates are thought to express the most probable values, and as such are 
incorporated into the plan.• For this reason the following are considered 
as "certainty equivalent" methods of reacting to uncertainty, meaning that 
the imperfect knowledge of the future is replaced by information which is 
felt to be subjectively "most certain". 
Expectation models for predicting future events include both "naive" 
and complex econometric models. The different models available, their 
use and their predictional accuracy under various circumstances have been 
well studied (4, 10, 22); an outline of the main procedures will be given 
here. 
One simple model for predicting the future is to assume that con­
ditions for the year ahead will remain the same as for the current year; 
such a system is apparently used by many farmers « Use of this system 
would yield reasonably accurate estimates where change in the relevant 
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variables fairly closely follows a linear trend, or where values occur 
bunched at some level over a period of conservative years. Employment of 
this model for price predictions by a large number of farmers can be a 
strong causal factor in the recurrence of commodity cycles. Where commod­
ity cycles are evident, farmers may more successfully apply an "opposites" 
model, predicting that prices for the next period will be the opposite of, 
or negatively correlated with, current prices. 
As a means of estimating future values of prices and yields a farmer 
may project the present trend in these variables (where this can be deter­
mined) into the future. This method can be highly accurate if an obvious 
and continuing trend in value does actually characterize the variables, 
although turning-point errors may still be made. Over the long run, trends 
in agricultural yields and prices may be discerned; but for somewhat 
shorter run purposes the application of this model may not give best 
results. 
For farmers who consider that the values of uncertainty variables are 
independent and random, the appropriate (but somewhat unsophisticated) 
model for deriving expectations for the year ahead would be to make a 
chance selection from values of past variables, or from the range of values 
considered possible. This approach is rather more appropriate for formu­
lating yield expectations, insofar as the quality of the weather in any 
one year appears to be randomly determined. Because successive prices 
are generally autocorrelated the random model is inappropriate for price 
prediction. 
One common expectation model is to base predictions on the mean values 
of yields and prices for an immediately past period. Several different 
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variations on this theme may be applied, including the mean outcome over 
a long period past or a more recent number of years; or possibly a cumu­
lative average could be developed from the farmers own experience, as every 
year he has the information for an additional year's outcomes to be in­
cluded in his average. Prediction in terms of a mean is a useful model 
where repeated decisions will be made over time, especially in cases where 
the variable of interest is randomly distributed (such as the weather). 
Where prices follow a cyclical pattern this model represents a rather con­
servative method of predicting the long run trend price as opposed to 
attempting to predict the actual movements in the price cycle. 
Using a modal value expectation model, a farmer would project the 
most frequent outcome „of the past into the planning period ahead. Where 
outcomes are normally distributed this model yields expectations identical 
with the mean method when based on a large selection of past values. Where 
the distribution of the variable is skewed, this method of selecting the 
most probable outcome will often give more accurate forecasts than the 
mean method. 
Yield and price expectations may be based upon a previous year or 
period which is looked upon as being notmal. This may be a valid approach 
during what is thought to be a temporary, distorted period such as war, 
depression, or unusual drought. Or, predictions may be determined on the 
basis of outcomes which occurred in some past period thought to parallel 
the present; such an approach is relevant where the farmer thinks that 
historical periods repeat themselves. In some cases in the past, these 
two models would have given good predictions, while in other instances 
they would have led to incorrect actions. 
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The above expectation models represent "rules of thumb" which may be 
adopted by the farmer, and his predictions developed by somewhat mechanical 
methods. One further way of obtaining information concerning the future 
is to draw on public and private outlook services (e.g. those provided 
by Land Grant Colleges) and formulate plans on this basis. This corresponds 
to Theil's (58, p. 414) delegation of responsibility in decision making 
between an "information animal" and a "choice animal" and such a division 
of labor would appear to be more efficient. Institutions providing outlook 
information can use complex econometric models and invest in a specialized 
process for deriving comprehensive assessments of possible future occur­
rences ; such procedures could not be employed by an individual farmer, 
but he could readily make use of the results obtained. 
The above discussion has been concerned with ways in which the farmer 
decision maker could reduce the uncertainty he faces in planning his pro­
duction by attempting to predict the conditions he will meet in the future. 
Shackle would perhaps reject, on philosophic grounds, the rationale behind 
attempts at predicting the future. He states (49, p. 34): "The word un­
certainty suggests an objectively existing future about w^ich we lack 
knowledge, rather than a void to be filled by new creation." 
Thus, he intimates that the future is unpredictable because its 
existence has not yet been created; and this creation when it occurs 
will involve elements of originality which cannot be forecast on the basis 
of what has already happened. 
This seemingly rather extreme viewpoint has some validity with respect 
to the prediction of individual human behavior. But it cannot be denied 
, that events appear to be governed by certain laws, and that the majority 
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of occurrences are broadly patterned on preceding occurrences. Within this 
context, the formulation of expectations by a farmer in an attempt to 
chart his path in an uncertain environment, where knowledge of the future 
is and must remain imperfect, is a worthwhile exercise to precede the 
making of a decision. 
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VI. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING 
The organizational methods discussed in the previous chapter imply 
a general acceptance of the uncertainty situation as it exists, and a cor­
responding attempt to reduce its effects upon farm income. The use of 
expectation models implies an attempt to overcome some of the uncertainty 
by predicting the future. A third method of adjusting to uncertainty is 
to take the relevant uncertainty factors specifically into account when 
making management decisions. Using this approach, a course of action is 
selected which is most appropriate in view of the nature of the situation 
and the farmer's objectives. The structuring and analysis of such decision 
problems under uncertainty is very conveniently accomplished using the 
concepts of game theory, which will therefore be discussed below. 
A decision making approach to uncertainty is not a unique or inde­
pendent area of study. Decisions are made concerning the adoption of a 
specific organizational structure for the farm, or concerning the expecta­
tion model to apply and whether to use the derived expectations as they 
stand. However, the implication of this section is that these decision 
models may be applied to recurrent decisions, and that they offer an 
additional means of improving the farmer's ability to approach the attain­
ment of his objectives. 
A. Game Theoretic Decision Models 
The main interest of this section lies in the area of the theory of 
games. This theory had its early beginnings in the work of the French 
mathematician Borel (5), and was developed and brought into the literature 
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of economics by von Neumann and Morgenstern (63). An eminently readable, 
non-mathematical account of the basic concepts and operations in game 
theory is contained in Williams (66); while Luce and Raiffa (38) have 
given a very complete treatment of the whole theory including the more 
recent developments. 
An excellent resume of the game theoretic approach has been given by 
Dresher (15, p. 1): 
"The theory of games of strategy may be described as a math­
ematical theory of decision making by participants in a com­
petitive environment. In a typical problem to which the theory 
is applicable, each participant can bring some influence to 
bear upon the outcome of a certain event; no single participant 
by himself nor chance alone can determine the outcome completely. 
The theory is then concerned with the problem of choosing an 
optimal course of action which takes into account the possible 
actions of the participant and the chance events." 
In this study, the main interest lies in that area of the theory 
which deals with two-person zero-sum games. In such games there are 
two players, conventionally designated as Player I (the maximizing player) 
and Player II (the minimizing player), and for each there exists a finite 
number of alternative courses of action which may be termed a strategy 
set. These may be denoted as: 
Player I has a choice of m actions, and Player II may choose his move 
from n alternatives. The rules for the game are that each player has but 
one move, and the moves must be taken simultaneously or in such a way 
that neither player knows the other's choice. Corresponding to each pair 
of actions (one chosen by each player) there exists a payoff matrix [Cjj]. 
Any Cjj (1=1,...,m and j=l,...,n) entry in this matrix is the outcome 
9 • • • > 
Anj] , the strategy set for Player I 
,Sn] , the strategy set for Player II 
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resulting from Player I having applied his ith strategy when Player II 
chose his ith strategy. A game situation may be generally represented 
by the following matrix of payoffs (consequences): 
Player II 
Player 
I 
Am 
Cil ' ' Cij 
'n 
Cn • • Cjl « « C In 
Cin 
Cml ' 1 cmj ' ' Cmn 
A variety of interpretations may be attached to the Cjj elements de­
pending on the context of the games (38, pp. 57-58); for the purposes of 
this study they will be taken to be dollar payoffs accruing to Player I. 
An outcome having a minus sign indicates a loss to Player I, while a 
positive sign denotes a gain. In strictly competitive games, the gains 
to Player I represent losses suffered by Player II, while losses by the 
first player are gains to the second. In this way the game is a zero-sum 
one ; the outcomes are defined such that the gains of one player are offset 
by the losses of the other. 
So far this outline may appear to have little relevance to agri­
culture. In a game the uncertainty is due entirely to the unknown decisions 
of the other player; and in the model the degree of uncertainty is reduced 
through the assumption that each player knows the desires of his opponent. 
For agricultural purposes however, a more apt description of the problem 
is a "game against Nature". The farmer (Player I) may again specify a set 
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of alternative courses of action, while a set of "states of Nature" char­
acterizes the alternatives available to Player II. The states of Nature 
may be weather, disease, prices, or any other natural uncertainty phenomena 
which the farmer cannot fully control or predict. It is obvious from this 
that Nature cannot be considered as a conscious adversary in the game; 
"she" is, in fact, merely a fictitious player having no known objective 
and no known strategy. Since the farmer need not assume that Nature has 
any specific desires towards his undoing, he may play the game according 
to any of several different criteria depending on his assessment of his 
own situation and the likely occurrence of any of the states of Nature. 
Games against Nature have the structure already discussed, where the 
set A represents the farmer's courses of action, the set S represents the 
possible states of Nature, and the matrix of outcomes [C^j] are dollar 
returns received by the farmer. Where the farmer refrains from attempting 
to predict the occurrences of any of the states of Nature, the games are 
played within a context of absolute uncertainty. If, on the other hand, 
the farmer makes some subjective assessment of the likelihood of any state 
of* Nature occurring, he may consider the problem as one of decision making 
under subjective risk. In either case there are different decision cri­
teria which may be applied in arriving at an optimal farmer strategy. The 
use of each of these will now be demonstrated by means of a simple 
numerical example of a game situation. * 
Assume that the farmer has three courses of action open to him, A^,A^, 
and Ag. Assume further that the states of Nature relevant to this situ­
ation are B^,S^, and Sg. The farmer actions could be thought of here as 
the selection of three different crop enterprises, say rice, oats and 
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corn; the states of Nature can represent poor, average, and good weather 
conditions. Corresponding to these strategy sets is the following matrix 
of outcomes showing the returns the farmer would get from each action 
under each of the possible weather conditions. 
S1 S2 S3 
A1 ( 10 15 20 ) ( ) 
A2 ( 10 20 30 ) 
( ) 
A3 ( 0 20 50 ) 
Given this situation, the farmer's problem is to decide which of the 
three crops it is best for him to grow. 
The first thing to notice here is that strategy would be an 
"inferior" course of action for any profit maximizing farmer to adopt. 
Whichever state of Nature prevails, the returns from A^ are never higher, 
and are often lower, than those from Ag. Consequently it would be super­
fluous for the farmer to consider A^ as one of his strategies. This con­
cept of the "dominance" of one row by another is an important one in 
reducing the complexity of the decision problem in many instances. Strict­
ly speaking, Nature, being the minimizing player, should never use 
strategies S^ or S3. The use of 8^ would always enable Nature to yield 
less to the farmer than any other strategy, regardless of the farmer's 
action; hence S^ dominates all other states of Nature and should be used 
at every play of the game. However, since Nature is ascribed no personal 
objectives, this argument does not apply. 
The farmer's decision problem has now been reduced to that of 
choosing between actions A2 and A3, the following payoff matrix being 
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relevant. 
S1 Sg S3 
A2 ( 10 20 30 ) 
C ) 
A3 ( 0 20 50 ) 
The farmer may select his optimal decision in this situation by the 
application of one of several different decision criteria. Each criterion 
will be presented below and its use in the solution of a decision problem 
will be demonstrated. 
1. Wald maximin criterion 
This criterion was suggested by Wald (65, p. 18), although in a 
slightly different form from the way it is used here.* In applying this 
criterion, each farmer act is assigned an index, which is its security 
level. The security level of an act is the minimum possible outcome from 
* that act. Thus for Ag this index has a value of 10, for A3 it has a value 
of zero in the above decision problem. The criterion states that the act 
whose associated index is a maximum will be chosen; in other words, the 
decision maker would make his choice so as to maximize his minimum possible 
gain. 
From the uncertainty situation by which he is faced, the farmer may 
therefore extract an item of certainty; namely, that by selecting alterna­
tive Ag his returns will never fall below a value of 10. 
In the example considered here, the optimal strategy is a "pure" 
Stfald termed this a "minimax" criterion since he used it in the con­
text of minimizing maximum losses. 
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strategy in the sense' that the criterion selects one, and only one, act 
as being optimal. The selection of pure strategies is characteristic of 
games which have a so-called "saddle point". A saddle point exists when­
ever, in the payoff matrix, an element which is the minimum value of its 
row (farmer act) is also the maximum value of its column (state of Nature). 
In the payoff matrix for the present problem the element having a 
value of 10, represents a relevant saddle point. The implication of a 
saddle point is that the result of the game is immediately specified; if 
both players adopt a Wald approach to the game, each will select that one 
of his strategies which contains the saddle point as an outcome. From 
its definition, the saddle point represents the maximin payoff for the 
maximizing player, and conversely the minimax payoff for the minimizing 
player. Neither player could find a better strategy than the one which 
yields the saddle point outcome. Even though Nature is not viewed as a 
minimizing player the existence of a saddle point always specifies a pure 
strategy solution for the farmer. 
In cases where a saddle point does not exist, the optimal maximin 
strategy for the farmer would be a mixed one. This means that he should 
apply more than one act (in a ratio determined by the values in the payoff 
matrix) and he would be guaranteed a somewhat higher security level or 
minimum gain. For example, consider the problem below. 
S1 S2 
A, ( 40 20 ) 
( ) 
A2 ( 10 30 ) 
Faced with the above situation, the farmer could guarantee himself a 
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minimum gain of 20 by adopting A^ as a pure strategy. Suppose, however, 
that in a series of such decisions he uses A^ with a frequency p and Ag 
with a frequency 1-p. 
There are optimum values for these frequencies which will guarantee 
the farmer some minimum gain V, regardless of the state of Nature which 
prevails. 
If the state of Nature S^, prevails: 
V = 40p + 10 (1-p) = 10 + 30p (1) 
If the state of Nature S^, prevails: 
V = 20p + 30 (1-p) = 30 - 10p (2) 
Since the minimum gain V is the same, regardless of the state of Nature, 
then : 
10 + 30p = 30 - lOp 
from which it may be seen that p = % and 1-p = %. By substituting these 
values into either of Equations 1 or 2, the minimum return that the farmer 
can expect under any state of Nature is seen to be 25. 
The implication of this is that if the farmer adopts A^ half of the 
time, and Ag the other half of the time, then over a series of such 
decisions he will be guaranteed a minimum gain of 25, as opposed to 20 
from the use of pure strategy Aj_. The selection of A^ or Ag at any point 
in time should be a random process, each act having the same probability 
of being chosen. 
Mixed strategies may be applied by farmers in several forms. Where 
the A% are crop enterprises, the crop acreage may be divided between the 
respective enterprises in the optimum proportion. Where the A^ are 
resource input levels, a proportion p of the enterprise units may receive 
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the one input level and a proportion 1-p of the units receive the other 
level. Thus, the use of a mixed strategy is analogous to diversification 
as discussed in the previous chapter. 
There also exists a theoretically optimal proportion in which Nature 
should use its two strategies in order to guarantee a lower minimax loss. 
Following the same algebraic manipulations as demonstrated, it may be seen 
that Nature should use and Sg in the proportions 1/4:3/4. In this 
way it could guarantee a long run maximum loss no higher than 25; whereas 
its best pure strategy has a minimax loss no better than 30. If both 
Nature and the farmer use their optimal mixed strategies, the value of 
the game will be 25; this is the minimax loss for Nature and the maximin 
gain for the farmer. 
For payoff matrices larger than that considered here, the optimal 
mixed strategies for both players may be more easily determined by con­
verting the game into a linear programming problem and solving by the 
simplex method (24, Chapter .15). 
The use of a Wald approach to decision making implies conservatism 
on the part of the farmer. Few farmers believe that Nature is trying to 
do its worst to them; but many farmers may give thought to the consequences 
that could result if the worst possible state of Nature should occur. Thus, 
a rancher may understock his grazing land for fear of a drought year. A 
farmer holding a precarious equity position might be forced out of business 
if a very unfavorable outcome occurs. However, the maximin payoff assured 
by the Wald criterion may be sufficient to enable him to continue farming. 
In this case the farmer might be willing to adopt a conservative course 
of action in order to gain this payoff level. Family responsibilities or 
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dislike for chance-taking may also cause a Wald solution to be used. 
2. Savage regret criterion 
L. J. Savage (45) suggested this criterion as an improvement over 
the Wald approach. Hie logic of the approach is that the farmer may wish 
to minimize his regret or dissatisfaction at having chosen the wrong 
alternative. Consider the following problem, where the payoffs represent 
dollar returns to the farmer. 
S1 S2 s3 
A, ( 15 20 25 ) 
( ) 
A2 ( 12 20 30 ) 
If the farmer selects Ag, and S^ happens to be the true state of Nature, 
then he has chosen the "wrong" alternative in the sense that his return 
would have been 3 dollars higher had he selected A^. He has a "regret" 
of 3 dollars. Similarly, the farmer has a regret if he selects A^, and 
Sg turns out to be the true state of Nature. 
To apply this criterion, a new matrix [r^j] is generated. Each ele­
ment rjj is formed by subtracting each outcome in the original payoff 
matrix from the maximum outcome in its column. The Wald solution rule 
is then applied to the regret matrix to determine the optimal course of 
action. The farmer would thus select that strategy which minimizes the 
maximum regret that he might experience. 
In the problem under consideration the regret matrix is: 
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Al ( 0 0 5 ) ( ) 
A2 ( 3 0 0 ) 
If A^ is selected it might yield a regret of 5, whereas the maximum 
regret experienced by selecting Ag would not be larger than 3. Hence 
if the farmer is motivated by desires to minimize his maximum potential 
dissatisfaction he should select strategy Ag. It is interesting to note 
in this case that if Sg were the true state of Nature, the farmer would 
feel no regret whichever decision he made. 
The regret matrix may be looked upon as an "opportunity cost" matrix, 
and in situations where the minimization of this cost would appear desir­
able the Savage criterion is most appropriate. In practice, the use of 
formal insurance is suggestive of the desire to minimax regrets. For 
example, a decision concerning the insurance of a crop against hail 
damage might be framed as follows: 
Hail No hail Regret matrix 
Do not insure A, ( -100 0 ) (95 0 ) 
( ) > ( ) 
Insure A^( -5 -5 ) (0 5 ) 
By selecting A^ and taking out insurance the farmer is assured of a regret 
no greater than 5, whereas by not insuring his regret may reach a level 
of 95. 
With regret matrices having no saddle point, the farmer may again 
compute an optimal mixed strategy which allows him a lower maximum regret 
than a pure strategy. 
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Both the Wald and the Savage criteria are conservative in the sense 
that they concentrate solely on the worst that can happen in any given 
situation. With pure strategies the emphasis is on short run rather than 
long run outcomes. The selection is made so as to assure some measure 
of certainty with respect to the outcome of that decision, rather than a 
series of such decisions. 
3. Hurwicz criterion 
Hurwicz (28) proposed that, instead of the ultra-cautious approach 
of making decisions by considering only the worst outcomes that could 
occur, a weighted average of the worst and best possible outcomes of each 
action might form a basis for choice. The weight given to each outcome 
considered should reflect the pessimism and optimism the decision maker 
feels in the uncertainty situation with which he is faced. 
The criterion is applied by first defining the decision maker's 
"pessimism index", QJ, having a numerical value lying between zero and one. 
The specific value of a for any decision maker can only be determined by 
that individual himself; it measures the general psychological state of 
gloom with which he envisages his situation. The value of a then repre­
sents the individual's pessimism that the worst outcome will follow his 
action, while the corresponding value of (1-0!) represents his optimism 
with respect to the occurrence of the best outcome. 
Let m^ denote the worst outcome and the best outcome that could 
follow the farmer's adoption of alternative A^. The expression: 
Ctoj + (1-Ot) M£ = a* (i=l,... ,m) 
demonstrates a method of calculating for each alternative an index (a*) 
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balancing the worst and best possible outcomes the farmer could experience 
by selecting that alternative. The act having the highest a* index is 
the preferred act, the one chosen by the Hurwicz criterion. If a = 1 
the criterion selects the same alternative as the Wald and the minimax 
solution is given; if a = 0 the maximax solution is preferred. 
The value of a is determined by the farmer after examination of his 
own feelings in the situation. There will be one value of a for which the 
decision maker will be indifferent between two alternatives; this is the 
value of a for which the Of* indeces of the two alternatives are the same. 
This indifference level may be computed from the following problem. 
Si ^2 =3 
A, ( 4 15 19 ) 
( ) 
A2 ( 0 20 24 ) 
a* = 4a + 19(1-0!) 0!* index for alternative A^  
a| = Oa + 24(1-0!) Of* index for alternative A^ 
Equating a* with a|: 
4a + 19(l-a) = Oa + 24(l-a) 
From which it may be seen that a = 3/5. 
In this case then, if 0  <  a  <  . 6 ,  Ag has the higher Of* index and is the 
preferred act. If .6 < a < 1, A^ has the higher O* index and is hence the 
preferred act. If a = .6, the decision maker would be indifferent between 
choosing A^ or A^. 
A suggested method of imputing an Ct level to oneself by a simple 
empirical problem is given by Luce and Raiffa (38, pp. 282-283). Consider 
the following decision problem. 
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Ai ( 0 1 ) ( ) 
Ag ( x x ) 
The a* index for A^ is 
oa + i(i-a) = 1-a 
The a* index for Ag is 
xa - x(l-a) = x 
When the individual is indifferent between selecting A^ or A^, then the a* 
indices for each act are equal; that is, when x = 1-a. 
If, by introspection concerning the above decision problem, the 
decision maker can specify a value of x such that he is indifferent between 
the two alternative acts, he has thus imputed the value of 1-a (and hence 
a) to himself. The higher the value of x, the lower is the value of a, 
hence the lower the individual's pessimism index. A low a may indicate 
a preference for gambling, or it may characterize an individual who must 
have a high return to stay in the game and who must therefore gamble. 
Langham (37) has suggested that in some problems a may take on dif­
ferent values for each alternative. Such a suggestion, however, is not 
easily reconcilable with the above method of imputing an a level to the 
decision maker ; for this empirical method implies that the value of a is 
not a variable, but rather a stable psychological characteristic of the 
individual, remaining constant for all situations. 
4. Laplace criterion 
This criterion is based upon the "principle of insufficient reason" 
(38, p. 284), and is appropriate for situations where absolute uncertainty 
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prevails concerning the likelihood of occurrence of the different states 
of Nature. Since there is no information that any one state of Nature 
is more likely than another, each state is assigned an equal probability 
of occurrence and the decision problem is essentially treated as one of 
risk. An èxpected outcome based on the assigned probabilities is computed 
for each farmer alternative, and the one yielding the highest expected 
value is the strategy, chosen by the Laplace criterion. The procedure 
is equivalent to averaging each act across the states of Nature, then 
selecting that act having the highest average outcome. 
The Laplace criterion corresponds to the use of an "average" model 
in expectations. It is essentially relevant to situations where a series 
of decisions will be made, for only in the longer run will enough outcomes 
be experienced to approach the expected value of gains. 
A common criticism of the foregoing decision criteria is that they 
are rationalized on some notion of complete ignorance. In practice, how­
ever, the decision maker may often have at least some partial information 
concerning the likely occurrence of some state or states of Nature. Thus, 
no matter how vague this information, he may not wish to consider himself 
in a condition of complete ignorance. To remedy this situation, a further 
decision criterion may be postulated. 
5. Expected value criterion 
Where the decision maker feels he has sufficient knowledge, he may 
wish to assign probabilities to each state of Nature. These may be a 
priori or subjective probabilities (46), in which case the decision is 
made as though under conditions of subjective risk. If empirical 
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probabilities can be assigned to each state of Nature, a so-called Bayes 
solution (20) is obtained. In either case, the criterion of choice is to 
select that act having the highest expected outcome. Where Pj is the 
probability associated with S., the optimal alternative therefore is that 
n J 
one having maximum 2 C..p^. It follows that if p. is the same for all j=l •LJ J J 
j (i«e. Pj = ^ ) then the Laplace solution is obtained. 
The theory of subjective probability advanced by Savage (46) contrib­
utes an interesting addition to the theory of decision making. It is 
postulated that a complete preference ordering of all acts exists for the 
decision maker, quite apart from any consideration of payoffs relevant 
to each act. Upon assigning subjective probabilities to each of Nature's 
states, the decision maker then selects that act whose expected utility 
is a maximum; the utility being obtained not only from the payoff itself, 
but also from his preference for the act apart from its payoffs. Such 
an approach allows for the fact that utility need not be derived solely 
from money income. 
B. Other Theories of Choice 
The models of decision making so far discussed are essentially 
normative in nature. They express what the decision maker could, and 
perhaps should, do in attempting to maximize some uncertain gain. On the 
other hand, the two models discussed in this section are descriptive. 
They are theories as to the way human beings actually do act in choice 
situations under imperfect knowledge. Although being descriptive theories 
they are logical subjects for empirical verification, such an attempt is 
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not made in this study. The models are presented to complete the back­
ground work in the area of decision making. 
1. Simon's theory of the satisficer 
One of Simon's (54) major considerations has already been discussed 
in Chapter III, and will be incorporated into the analytical framework 
used in later chapters of this study. It is argued, that in complex 
situations the real-world decision maker does not, because he cannot, con­
sider all the possible factors conditioning his decision. Rather, he 
selects some subset of these factors commensurate with his mental capa­
bilities, and bases his decision on these alone. A second feature of 
the model is that, in making his decision, the individual behaves as a 
"satisficer" who seeks some course of action which is "good enough" as 
far as he is concerned. Rather than striving for a maximum gain, the 
decision maker is thought to have some aspiration level which he wishes 
to attain. Any considered act whose outcome may lie below this level is 
regarded as unsatisfactory. In a given situation there may be several 
satisfactory considered acts, and any of these may be selected; as long 
as the chosen act meets the aspiration level, the individual is behaving 
in an "intendedly rational" manner. 
In many instances, Simon's decision maker may act in exactly the 
same way as a Wald decision maker, and in this case the two corresponding 
models appear to be equivalent. This would occur when the individual's 
aspiration level was equal to the maximin payoff for the set of available 
acts. But Simon would be unlikely to agree with anyone equating his model 
with a game theoretic model. He is somewhat critical of the game theoretic 
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approach to decision making and its variants, believing them to be based 
on the unrealistic assumptions of "virtual omniscience and unlimited compu­
tational power" (54, p. 202). He does not suggest that these assumptions 
may be relaxed by accepting his hypothesis of simplifying the real-world 
situation, and then applying the algorithmic procedures to the simplified 
version of the decision problem. Such a blending of Simon's model with 
a game theoretic model is, however, attempted in this study. 
2. Shackle's theory of potential surprise 
Shackle (48) introduced a theory to explain decision making in what 
he called "non-divisible non-seriable" situations. In such unique situ­
ations he holds probability considerations and expectations to be entirely 
irrelevant, for they imply repetition of the decision; but the decisions 
Shackle is interested in are of the type that are met perhaps once, or 
a very small number of times. 
In making a decision, the individual is said to consider each possible 
outcome in terms of the potential surprise he would feel should it occur. 
Within a certain "inner range" of outcomes the decision maker would feel 
no surprise. Beyond this rangé, the degree of potential surprise rises 
as the outcome (gain or loss) becomes more extreme. For each available 
act, a focus-gain and focus-loss pair of outcomes are identified, these 
being the two outcomes having the greatest power to arrest the decision 
maker's attention. The attention-arresting power of an outcome is a 
positive function of its desirability (or undesirability) and a negative 
function of its potential surprise. By some conscious or subconscious 
process these pairs of focus-outcomes are standardized in terms of utility. 
54 
The standardized pairs, one set for each act, are then evaluated on the 
decision maker's gambling indifference system; and the act whose standard­
ized focus-outcome pair lies highest on this loss versus gain indifference 
system will then be selected. 
Shackle's theory suggests how subjective and individual the process 
of decision making is. When absolute uncertainty or complete ignorance 
as to the likelihood of any outcome prevails, then the decision maker would 
feel no surprise whichever one occurred. Each one is equally possible 
as far as he is concerned, and his focus-outcomes are then merely the best 
and worst outcomes of each act. The decision being based on these pairs, 
the Shackle analysis in this case is very close to that of Hurwicz. Also, 
some of Shackle's statements (49, p. 47) suggest how, in certain instances, 
his own theory includes the Wald maximin criterion as a special case. 
Like Simon, Shackle looks with disdain upon a game theoretic approach 
to decision making. He says' (50, p. 6): 
"Decision is not choice amongst the delimited and prescribed 
moves in a game with fixed rules and a known list of possible 
outcomes of any move or a sequence of moves. There is no 
assurance that anyone can in advance say what set of hypotheses 
a decision maker will entertain concerning any specified act 
available to him. Decision is thought and not merely determinate 
response." 
He specifically criticizes game theory and games of chance on the basis 
of the impossibility of obtaining a complete listing of all possible out­
comes of an action. But his own theory provides for the decision maker 
to consider only that number of outcomes he can handle; so why could not 
such a simplification be adopted in framing a game problem? That it can 
be is demonstrated in the following chapters. 
VII. SOME PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the preceding chapter the theory of games was introduced and it 
was shown that, in the form of games against Nature, procedures for farm 
decision making under uncertainty could be specified. Given the repre­
sentation of a problem in terms of the sets of alternative actions open 
to both the farmer and Nature, and the matrix of outcomes corresponding 
to each action pair, the decision maker can apply certain criteria in 
order to determine the act which is optimal in his given circumstances. 
The intention in the next chapters is to demonstrate the application 
of game theoretic principles in the analysis of a situation requiring a 
decision between alternative courses of action. The problem for the farmer 
is that it is not immediately obvious which is his best course of action, 
for he cannot be sure of the exact outcome of any one of them. He knows 
only that for each alternative there is a set of outcomes which can occur; 
the one which will occur depends upon an unknown state of Nature. The 
final selection must be based upon a comparison of outcome sets rather than 
a comparison of individual outcomes. The procedure for selecting that 
outcome set which specifies the optimal act is given by the different 
decision criteria discussed in the previous chapter. Each outcome set is 
evaluated in relation to the appropriate criterion of choice and one act 
will be selected as being "optimal according to the criterion". The 
criterion of choice which will be applied, and hence the act which will 
be considered optimal, is related to the farmer's situation, objectives 
and psychology. Depending upon his subjective assessment of the problem 
setting, the farmer may consider himself to be facing conditions of 
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absolute uncertainty or merely of risk. 
The empirical approach which is used in this study is designed to 
be applicable at the farm level. It is based upon the assumption that the 
decision problem can be reduced in complexity to a level where the main 
elements of the situation only are included in the problem analysis. It 
is felt that the use of a game theoretic framework provides a concise way 
of setting down the components of a decision situation and enables the 
farmer to adopt a systematic approach to his decision making. 
Strictly speaking, the analysis applied here does not satisfy the 
full conditions of true game, because of the incomplete specification of 
known alternatives. For most farmers a full theoretical game would have 
little practical value in decision making. The task of securing the 
requisite information concerning all alternative courses of action, states 
of Nature, and corresponding outcomes is indeed a formidable one, and the 
computations involved in compiling and solving the game would hardly be 
relished. Thus, for a game theoretic approach to be of any value to 
farmers it must rely on an approximate representation of the problem 
elements, but which nonetheless encompasses the range of actions and states 
of Nature. 
When faced with a decision situation the farmer may be thought of 
as selecting, from the whole range of actions objectively open to him, a 
subset of actions which he feels he can handle in his analysis of the 
problem. This will be his "considered set" of alternatives. Similarly 
he will select from the whole range of possible states of Nature a con­
sidered set which represents the range of conditions he may face. 
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For example, suppose the relevant states of Nature for a particular 
decision problem were the possible weather conditions that may occur in 
the season ahead Strictly speaking, each year experienced represents 
a different state of Nature. However, if the farmer thought in purely 
qualitative terms, he might identify as states of Nature the following 
weather conditions: disastrous weather, extremely bad, very bad, bad, 
quite bad, not too good, below average, average, ... etc. all the way up 
to perfect weather. If he thought in quantitative terms (perhaps in terms 
of some numerical weather index) he could identify many more states of 
Nature. In either case he would then have the problem of first finding 
out the outcomes of any action under each state of Nature, and subsequently 
evaluating these outcomes in relation to his situation and objectives to 
find his optimal alternative. Such a process would be tedious, if not 
unsuccessful. 
On the other hand it is hypothesized that such completeness is not 
necessary for arriving at a wise decision, nor are farmers likely to 
attempt such precision. In reality a farmer is more likely to think in 
terms of years he can remember which had "real bad weather" or "real 
good weather"; for other years the weather might be considered as being 
"about average". It is in this way that the states of Nature may be 
broadly characterized, rather than by identifying "a mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive listing of those aspects of Nature which are relevant to 
this particular choice problem and about which the decision maker is 
uncertain" (38, p. 277). 
Similarly, the whole set of alternative courses of action objectively 
available to the farmer may be simplified. In a decision as to the optimum 
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marketing weight of hogs, 21 different marketing weights between 200 
pounds and 300 pounds (inclusive) can be specified, based upon a 5-pound 
increment in weight. Each is an alternative course of action for the 
farmer. However, a farmer could probably not obtain relevant costs and 
returns data for each marketing weight under several possible price con­
ditions (states of Nature). Therefore although each marketing weight 
represents, objectively speaking, an alternative course of action, a 
smaller set of somewhat more aggregated alternatives must be considered. 
A further reason for a reduction in the number of farmer alternatives 
considered may stem from the farmer's personal reaction to some of the 
alternative actions that are available to him. Although in economic 
situations the means are supposed to have no value connotations attached 
to them directly (43), this cannot always be assumed so. For example, a 
farmer may find the sight of a large overfat hog to be aesthetically dis­
pleasing to him; and in this case he may then not consider marketing at 
any weight above (say) 260 pounds (however profitable this may be), so 
limiting the number of his possible courses of action. 
In sum then, farmer decision problems may be simplified to a level 
where, though not an exhaustive description of reality, they are a valid 
representation of the situation faced, and are within the computational 
capacities of the decision maker. When placed within a simplified frame­
work of games against Nature, the uncertainty elements in a complex 
situation may be more easily distinguished; and this also enables a more 
systematic approach to the making of decisions. As a result, a closer 
approximation to the selection of an optimal act would be obtained than 
by the use of more random, habitual or intuitive methods of choice. That 
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such a process of simplification is conducted by most decision makers 
has been affirmed by many authors (7, 48, 53); and in line with Simon's 
(53) thinking, such action is still considered to be rational. 
The use of an incomplete or simplified problem representation will 
not necessarily enable the determination of the absolute optimum, the 
optimum optimorum alternative, since this alternative may not be specifical­
ly listed in the considered set of actions. Conversely, if the alterna­
tives are specified in such detail as to insure inclusion of the absolutely 
optimal act then the game is likely to be so complex that no systematic 
analysis might be conducted. For this reason it is claimed that the 
simplified game theoretic representation and analysis used here will 
enable the farmer to determine as best as. possible which is his wisest 
decision. 
In the following two chapters the method of applying a game theoretic 
analysis to farmer decision problems will be demonstrated. Examples are 
given for decision making under the two main types of uncertainty faced 
by farmers, that is, technical (or yield) uncertainty and price uncertainty. 
The method is generally applicable, however, to any situation wherein the 
component forces of farmer action and states of Nature can be identified. 
Each chapter includes also a comparison of the theoretically derived 
optimal decisions with actual farmer decisions under the same uncertainty 
conditions assumed in the analysis. The purpose of these comparisons was 
to determine whether farmer actions suggested the use of a game theoretic 
approach, and if so, which of the alternative criteria appears to have 
most historical relevance in agricultural decision making. 
It is possible that some farmers already use a game theoretic type 
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of approach to decision making under uncertainty. Although not neces-
sairly laying out the problem in a game framework and formally applying 
the decision criterion relevant to their specific situations, they may, 
by some intuitive process or by reasoning similar to that built into the 
game theoretic approach, arrive at the same optimal decisions that a game 
analysis would suggest. In other words a farmer may act as JLf he were 
applying game theory (much the same as the celebrated billiard player of 
Friedman and Savage (19, p. 298) plays as if he knows the mathematical 
mechanics describing his shots) without being cognizant of the theory 
behind his actions. 
There are two main ways of determining whether game theory has 
practical validity in farmer behavior. One is the method applied by 
Dillon (14), that of facing farmers with a hypothetical decision problem 
portrayed as a game against Nature and asking them what decisions they 
would make in this situation. Farmer decisions and the theoretical optima 
derived from the game are then compared for similarities. As pointed 
out by several writers (3, 9, 56), there are drawbacks to this approach. 
Firstly, farmers may not be able to conceive of thé problem as set before 
them or they may not be able to mentally transfer themselves into the 
decision situation; then, if the problem lacks realism for them, their 
decisions are likely to be unrealistic. Also, one of the pitfalls to 
any interviewing procedure is the "socially acceptable" answer. When 
questioned about the decisions they would make, farmers' answers may be 
conditioned by what they feel they should do; and their stated decisions 
may differ widely from the way they might act in reality when their own 
money and success are at stake. 
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Another way of studying farmer decision making is through the use of 
historical farm records. In this case there is no doubt as to how a 
farmer reacts in a given situation, for the decisions actually made are 
on record, and can be compared with the game theoretic decisions. This 
approach, similarly, is not without its disadvantages. If comparison is 
the objective, the assumption must be made that the game framework used 
to derive optimal decisions closely approximates the decision situation 
as viewed by the farmer. And also that the decisions made were conditioned 
by the uncertain environment and were not purely random or habitual. 
In the comparative sections of the next chapters it is assumed that the 
farmers were reacting to uncertainty when making their decisions, and 
that the fairly simplified game situations represent a reality which was 
recognized by the decision makers. 
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VIII. RESOURCE USE IN CROP PRODUCTION UNDER CONDITIONS 
OF WEATHER UNCERTAINTY 
Of all the uncontrollable influences which affect crop production, 
that of weather is probably the greatest. The amount of rainfall, its 
timing and distribution over the growing season, temperatures, hours of 
sunshine, the occurrence of frost, hailstorms or windstorms are all vari­
ables which strongly affect the planting, growing, ripening and harvesting 
of crops. The occurrence and effects of mycological and entomological 
infestations in crop plants are also very much related to weather phenom­
ena. In short the quality of the weather exerts a powerful influence on 
the profitability of crop production. To an extent, the possible adverse 
consequences of poor weather can be averted by such techniques as irri­
gation or the selection of early maturing, disease resistant plant 
varieties; and with tolerable accuracy the weather may be forecasted for 
short periods into the future. But still the influence of the weather 
on his fortunes in the season ahead remains an important imperfection in 
the farmer's knowledge. Insofar as the existence of weather cycles has 
not been indisputably determined, and each year's weather appears to be 
independent of the preceding year's, then the quality of the weather may 
be thought of as a random variable. This being so, decisions whose out­
comes are affected dominantly by weather are made under conditions of 
absolute uncertainty. Where historical weather records are available and 
the probability of particular weather conditions occurring may be deter­
mined, the problem can then be converted to one of decision making under 
risk. Both types of approach are demonstrated in this chapter. 
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The effect of weather on crop production is to alter the height and 
shape of the production function, thus altering the responses to the input 
factors. Bad weather in general will lower the production function, while 
very good weather will raise the function above its mean level. The prob­
lem facing a farmer when selecting his input level in the production of 
a particular crop stems from the uncertainty with respect to the exact 
production function which will hold in the season ahead. He cannot be sure 
of the yield responses to any input factor and hence he cannot ex ante 
determine the profit maximizing input level• As Knetsch (35) pointed out, 
weather differences may be expected to cause extreme variations in 
fertilizer-yield relationships, such that the optimal rate of fertilization 
estimated for one set of weather conditions may be entirely inappropriate 
for a different set. How, then, should a farmer react in such circum­
stances? By analyzing this uncertainty situation in the framework of a 
game against Nature, an input level which will attain some objective with 
certainty can be determined. As an illustration, the determination of 
optimal levels of nitrogen application in corn production is shown in this 
chapter, with examples being drawn from two areas in Iowa. 
In attempting to place a decision problem into a game framework, the 
first task is to identify the considered sets of farmer actions and states 
of Nature. The farmer's action set will consist of those actions which 
he would consider taking, of which he feels he is capable, and for which 
he can detect some significant differences in possible outcomes. The 
identification of states of Nature depends on the farmer's ability to 
recognize the main uncontrollable factors which influence the outcomes 
64 
of his actions, and to specify particular levels of these factors which 
represent the events he may have to face in the season ahead. Where 
decisions have to be made in the face of weather uncertainty, the question 
arises as to how to characterize the states of Nature; in other words, 
some measure of weather phenomena is required. 
Units for measuring the complex of weather are hard to find, and 
they generally consider only one or two facets, such as rainfall and 
temperature. The farmer is not interested in the values of these variables 
per se, but rather his concern lies in the combined effect of these and 
related aspects of weather on the yield of his crops. Hence an appropriate 
index might be one which is based on the resultant effects of weather 
rather than upon actual weather characteristics. Such an approach was 
used to characterize the states of Nature in the analysis of this chapter, 
the weather index used being developed from the work of Shaw and Durost 
(51) • 
Insofar as variations in weather from year to year cause annual 
variations in crop yields, then a measure of historical weather phenomena 
may be developed from historical yield records. Shaw and Durost, in 
deriving their "corn yield-weather index" for Iowa selected yield records 
from the Iowa Corn Yield Test (ICYT). The yield data at each location 
represented the average yield in bushels per acre.of all hybrids tested 
at that location. The procedure was as follows : 
(a) For each of the twelve ICYT Districts of the state, a nine-year 
moving average was computed as a first approximation of the trend in 
yields; (although appearing somewhat arbitrary, a nine-year period 
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was considered most appropriate after testing other, moving averages 
of five, seven and eleven years). 
(b) Next, actual yields for each year were divided by the corresponding 
moving average yield. Any year in which this percentage ranged from 
85 to 115 was considered an average weather year for the purpose 
of making a second approximation of the yield trend. It was these 
"average-weather yields" which were used as a basis for computing 
the final trend; by using yields for these years only, the years 
of extreme weather do not affect the trend. 
(c) A series of straight line trends between mean yields of groups of 
average-weather years was used to approximate the trend yields for 
the intervening years in which actual weather was not average. 
(d) A five-year moving average of the yields in average weather years 
(derived in step (c)) was computed and used as the final measure 
of the trend in yields at the given location. 
The above four steps were taken to derive a realistic estimate of the 
trend in corn yields for each ICYT District. The final step is to compute 
the weather index. 
(e) For any given year, the weather index in a particular District is 
computed by dividing the actual yield by the trend yield. The 
favorability (unfavorabi1ity) of the weather in that year is then-
indicated by the extent to which the computed index exceeds (falls 
short of) 100. Weather is thus measured in terms of the effect it 
has in distorting yields away from their trend level. 
From the nature and derivation of the above weather index, it can be 
seen that, first, it evades the difficulties involved in specifying and 
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evaluating the relevant component variables in the weather complex. 
Secondly, it includes a measure of more than just atmospheric conditions; 
within its scope it encompasses the effects of both weather-related factors 
(such as the incidence of insect and fungus diseases) and other uncontrol­
led elements which influence yields. As such it might perhaps be more 
appropriately called a "Nature index" since it more completely reflects 
all those elements which make up the states of Nature than does a mere 
weather index. However, insofar as this index measures the effect on 
yields of all those uncontrollable factors a farmer faces in corn produc­
tion, it is ideally suited to the characterization of states of Nature in 
the analysis of decision making problems. The index will be incorporated 
into the game analyses below. 
A. Nitrogen Application to Corn in Northeastern Iowa 
The optimal weather conditions for the production of corn in Iowa are 
very critical, especially with respect to rainfall and temperature.* Any 
deviations in these variables above or below their optimal levels result 
in less than maximum yields at any given input level. In practice, 
"perfect" corn growing weather in this sense is rarely experienced, and 
actual weather conditions may fall very far below this optimum; and in 
consequence returns to input factors may decline far from their potential 
^Thompson (60, 61) states the following monthly weather conditions 
as being optimal; June — less than average rainfall and greater than 
average temperature; July and August — greater than average rainfall, 
less than average temperature. The most critical variables are July 
rainfall, August temperature and July temperature, in that order. The 
optimal values of these variables are: 6 inches rainfall, 75° F and 72° F 
respectively. 
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level. This being the case, the marginal returns from input factors being 
indefinite, how is the farmer to determine his optimal (profit maximizing) 
input level? If he commits himself to a high level of inputs and poor 
weather conditions cause a low output response, his marginal costs (and 
perhaps total costs) may far exceed marginal (and total) returns. Con­
versely, if the farmer decides conservatively to use a low input level and 
excellent weather materializes, he can be foregoing the opportunity of 
reaping extra profits arising from abnormally high yield responses to 
relatively small increments in input. 
In the production of corn, fertilizer is an important input factor. 
Managerial decisions relating £o fertilizer use are becoming of more sig­
nificance since the increased use of fertilizer has been one of the main 
features of the technological revolution in agricultural production. Yet 
for many farmers a strong reason for not applying fertilizer is the vari­
ability of the weather (67). How then might the weather uncertainty be 
accounted for in the planning of a farm fertilizer program? The analysis 
of this chapter suggests a possible approach the farmer might adopt. 
Of the fertilizer elements, nitrogen has most effect on corn yield 
(64, p. 46), so the decision problem analyzed below concerns itself with 
the determination of an optimal nitrogen application rate. The levels of 
phosphorus and potassium are assumed to be such as to not limit yields. 
1. The problem analysis 
The corn yield data used here were obtained from long-time experiments 
conducted on the Carrington-Clyde Experimental Farm at Iowa State Univer­
sity since 1950. The Carrington-Clyde Farm is situated in Iowa Corn Yield 
Test District 6, which is in northeastern Iowa. Consequently the results 
of this analysis might apply directly to farmers in this district. 
a. The states of Nature The decision problem was constructed on 
the assumption that the farmer wishes to extract merely the main elements 
from a complex reality. From the whole range of weather conditions that 
can conceivably occur, three broad classes of weather conditions were 
identified; these will be called Bad, Average and Good weather and will 
be identified by the symbols S^, Sg and S3, respectively. Examination of 
the yield weather indices for ICYT District 6 indicated that the year of 
poorest weather occurred in 1950, for which the index was 74. Similarly, 
a year of average weather was 1952 (with index of 97) while good weather 
characterized 1961 when the index rose to 114. 
Thus, the considered set of states of Nature [S^jSgjS^] is represented 
by the possible occurrence of weather conditions having indices [74,97,114]. 
b. The farmer alternatives A large number of alternative levels 
of nitrogen fertilization can be specified depending on the increment in 
pounds of nitrogen separating each alternative. Thus, for instance, pos­
sible farmer actions might be the application of nitrogen at one of the 
following rates: 0,5,10,15,... 150 pounds per acre; specification in this 
detail is not possible because of the lack of relevant yield data. The 
experiments on the Carrington-Clyde Farm were conducted under three 
nitrogen regimes, those of zero, 40, and 80 pounds per acre. For the 
purposes of this problem therefore the considered set of farmer actions 
[A^.Ag.Ag] was taken as the application of [0,40,80] pounds of nitrogen 
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per acre. 
c. The payoff matrix The experimental yields of corn under the 
three levels of nitrogen treatment for each of the three years selected 
as epitomizing the three considered states of Nature were used as a first 
representation of the outcomes faced by the farmer. Under the experimental 
conditions the corn was harvested by hand, and hence there were no field 
losses such as are prevalent with mechanical harvesting. In order to 
bring yield estimates into line with those obtained under practical farming 
conditions, the experimental yields were deflated by 15 per cent to 
introduce the effects of yield losses from the usual farm harvesting 
methods. 
The construction of the game against Nature and the resulting 3x3 
payoff matrix in terms of bushels of corn per acre are summarized in Table 
i. 
If the farmer's objectives were visualized in terms of mere yields 
(if, for instance, he wished to attain maximum yield per acre) his game 
analysis would be conducted oh the payoff matrix of Table 1. However in 
the more realistic case wherein the objective is the maximization of 
profits, account must be taken of the costs and possible returns implied 
by the farmer's alternatives. The first step is to compute the "gross 
revenue matrix" as in Table 2, by determining the gross values of the 
possible yield outcomes in the game. Secondly, the "net revenue matrix" 
of Table 3 is derived by subtracting from the gross revenue associated 
with each farmer alternative the nitrogen costs incurred in adopting 
that alternative. The prices that were assumed were $1.20 per bushel 
for corn and 15 cents per pound of nitrogen (includes cost of material 
Table 1. The formulation of the game against Nature 
States of Nature: -- Bad weather; e.g. 1950, Weather Index = 74 
$2 " Average weather; e.g. 1952, Weather Index = 97 
Sg -- Good weather; e.g. 1961, Weather Index = 114 
Farmer alternatives: A^ -- Apply 0 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
Ag -- Apply 40 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
Ag — Apply 80 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
Farmer-Nature payoff matrix (in bushels of corn per acre): 
Experimental yields deflated by 15% to bring them to on-farm levels 
Farmer alternatives S1 
States of Nature 
s2 S3 
A1 22.78 50.07 87.30 
A2 19.98 57.21 108.10 
A3 21.17 67.24 115.40 
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Table 2. Gross revenue matrix3 (in dollars per acre) 
States of Nature 
Farmer alternatives S1 S2 S3 
V 27.36 60.12 104.76 
A2 24.00 ' 68.64 129.72 
A3 
25.44 80.64 138.48 
aCorn price assumed to be $1.20 per 
» 
bushel. 
Table 3. Net revenue matrix3 (in dollars per acre) 
States of Nature 
Farmer alternatives S1 S2 S3 
A1 27.36 60.12 104.76 
A2 
18.00 62.64 123.72 
A3 13.44 
68.64 126.48 
aCorn price — $1.20 per bushel 
Nitrogen price -- 15ç per pound 
Cost associated with alternative -- $0 
Cost associated with alternative Ag -- $6.00 
Cost associated with alternative A^ -- $12.00. 
plus handling). 
With the matrix of net payoffs in Table 3, the game is now in the 
form best suited to analysis by the farmer. Each element in the payoff 
matrix represents the returns, over and abpve nitrogen costs, that he may 
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receive following his adoption of a particular alternative and the subse­
quent manifestation of a particular state of Nature. It is taken that all. 
other production costs apart from nitrogen are about the same for each 
farmer alternative; the payoffs then represent the amounts available to 
pay this fixed production cost plus any excess being the farmer's profit. 
Faced with this situation, how should the farmer make his decision as to 
the optimal level of nitrogen application? The results suggested by the 
different decision criteria shed some light on this problem. 
d. The game solutions In the strict game sense Nature should 
never use her alternatives Sg and Sg, since these are inferior to in 
terms of a minimizing objective. Reality demands, however, that the 
attribution of any such objectives to Nature be discounted, and hence the 
game need not be reduced to the one column S^. 
Any farmer who feared that the worst state of Nature would occur, or 
who had to be assured of a satisfactory minimum return should apply the 
Wald criterion in making his decision. From the payoff matrix in Table 3 
it is obvious that alternative guarantees the farmer a return of at 
least $27.36 to pay for other production costs. No other farmer alterna­
tive can yield a return as high as this with certainty — although all 
have the possibility of yielding higher returns. Consequently, the "best" 
decision for a conservative-minded farmer attempting to maximize his 
minimum return would be to select alternative A^ and apply no nitrogenous 
fertilizer at all. Such a decision implies caution on the part of the 
decision, maker and a preoccupation with short run outcomes; rather than 
take the gamble of either losing the money spent on fertilizer or gaining 
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a higher profit, he prefers a "middle-of-the-road" approach with less 
variability in outcomes. 
Another conservative decision criterion, the Savage regret criterion, 
again leads the farmer to select alternative A^ and apply no nitrogen. 
The regret matrix in Table 4 was derived by replacing each element in the 
net payoff matrix by the difference between that element and the largest 
element in its column. Thus the regret matrix indicates the magnitudes 
of the ex post dissatisfactions experienced by the farmer if he chose a 
fertilizer level which did not yield a maximum return under the state 
of Nature which occurred. 
A farmer whose concern lies in minimizing the maximum possible regret 
he might feel when the outcome of his decision finally becomes known 
would thus apply no nitrogen to his corn. By taking this decision he can 
be sure that his regret will not be higher than an amount equivalent to 
$8.52, and may possibly be much lower. With the selection of a different 
alternative he is subject to a higher level of regret -- though again 
there is the possibility of it being lower. Thus, this criterion, like 
Table 4. The Savage regret matrix 
Farmer alternatives 
States 
S1 
of Nature 
S2 S3 
Maximum regret 
A1 0 8.52 3.24 8.52* 
A2 9.36 6.00 2.76 9.36 
A3 13.92 0 0 13 = 92 
^Minimum maximum regret. 
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the Wald criterion, implies a conservative attitude on the part of the 
farmer, and a preference for a modicum of certain knowledge concerning 
the short run. 
If the farmer is less concerned with the outcomes in individual years, 
but considers the probable long run outcome under a series of weather con­
ditions, then the Laplace criterion is a more appropriate one to apply. 
Each state of Nature is assumed to occur with a probability of one third, 
there being assumed no objective foreknowledge of the occurrence of any 
< one. The Laplace criterion selects that farmer alternative having the 
highest expected value under these conditions; this is alternative Aj, 
the application of 80 pounds of nitrogen per acre. Although by selecting 
» 
A-j the outcome in any one year may be less favorable than that from A^ 
or Ag, over a period of years an average annual return of $69.52 per acre 
may be expected. This expected return is higher than that afforded by 
any other alternative, and thus satisfies a long run profit maximizing 
objective. 
Finally, the Hurwicz criterion indicates that either of alternatives 
Ap A2 or Ag may be optimal for the farmer, depending on his disposition. 
Being unaware of which state of Nature is most likely, he considers the 
best and worst outcomes that might follow each alternative action, and 
then makes his decision on the basis of a weighted average of these out­
comes. The weights, a and (1-00, reflect the pessimism and optimism 
he feels with respect to the occurrence of these outcomes. Thus, a farmer 
viewing this decision situation with pessimism, whose a index has a value 
between 0.67 and 1, would select alternative A]_; as he views the situation, 
the use of no nitrogen fertilizer is likely to give him the highest return 
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(as measured by the a* index). Similarly, a less pessimistic farmer, for 
whom 0.38 < CK < .67 would select alternative Ag; while an optimistic 
farmer having 0 < a < .38 would feel that A3 would yield him the highest 
return. A farmer having the borderline values of a (a = 0.67 or a = 0.38) 
would be indifferent between alternatives A^ and Ag or Ag and A3 respec­
tively. In summary, the results indicated by the Hurwicz criterion 
demonstrate how the concept of the optimal!ty of decisions cannot be 
considered independently of the decision maker's subjective evaluation of 
the situation he faces. . 
It may be argued that, when considering weather phenomena as the 
relevant states of Nature in a decision problem, knowledge of the future 
need not be totally imperfect. If sufficient historical weather data is 
available the probabilities of occurrence of the three states of Nature 
can be estimated, and the future may then be viewed in a risk rather than 
an uncertainty context. In such a problem setting, the farmer could 
logically attempt to maximize his expected returns over a period of years 
in his corn fertilization program. With a long series of values for the 
weather index it is possible to transform the decision problem in this 
way, and to determine the farmers' optimal alternative in the resultant 
risk situation. 
Over the 20-year period 1942-1961, the mean weather index for the 
ICYT District 6 was 99. It was assumed that values of the weather index 
within a range of 25 around this mean value may still be considered under 
the classification of "average weather"; and hence "bad weather" is 
characterized by an index value < 87 while "good weather" has an index 
> 111. Upon examination of the weather indices for the 20-year period, 
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the following probabilities were determined: 
Bad weather (S^): Index < 87 , probability (p^) = 6/20 = 0.3 
Average weather (Sg): Index 87-111, probability (pg) = 10/20 = 0.5 
Good weather (Sg): Index > 111, probability (pg) = 4/20 = 0.2 
By multiplying each element in the payoff matrix of Table 3 by the 
probability that that outcome will occur, a new payoff matrix for decision 
making under risk is obtained. Summing the elements across each row of 
the new matrix yields the expected values (i.e. expected returns) of the 
respective farmer alternatives. The optimal decision for the farmer in 
this situation is to select that act which yields him the highest expected 
return; as can be seen in Table 5 this would be Ag, an application rate 
of 80 pounds of nitrogen. 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the application of different 
decision criteria to a problem of determining the optimal rate of nitrogen 
application to corn under conditions of weather uncertainty. A summary 
of the alternatives selected by the criteria and other pertinent infor-
Table 5. The payoff matrix for decision making under risk (in dollars per 
acre) 
States of Nature 
Farmer 
alternatives 
S1 
(P]=-3) 
S2 
(p2=-5) 
S3 
(P3=-2) 
Row totals 
(expected returns) 
A1 8.21 30.06 20.95 59.22 
*2 5.40 31.32 24.74 61.46 
A3 4.03 34.32 25.30 63.65* 
^Maximum expected return. 
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mat!on is presented in Table 6. From this it is immediately obvious that 
there is no one "optimal" decision, no unique solution to the game. 
Depending on an individual farmer's objectives, resource position, con­
servatism or optimism, a different alternative may be preferred. It 
does appear, however, that for a strictly profit maximizing farmer who 
can withstand the lower net returns of an occasional bad-weather year, 
his best decision is Ag, the application of 80 pounds of nitrogen per 
acre. The framework used here provides a useful means of identifying the 
main components of a decision situation, and encourages a systematic 
approach to the selection of an alternative. It is interesting to note 
that from a perusal of the payoff matrix in Table 3 one might intuitively 
feel that alternative A^ was the best decision. The farmer is not subject 
to the very low return possible under Ag, and yet he can achieve returns 
almost as high as Ag and far higher than under A^. However, this alterna­
tive was selected by only one criterion (Hurwicz with .38 < a < .67) and 
is only optimal in the special case of an "unoptimistic, unpessimistic" 
decision maker. On the other hand, alternatives A^ and Ag were each 
optimal according to three criteria. 
2. Comparison with actual farmer decisions 
Having derived theoretically optimal decisions concerning nitrogen 
application to corn under weather uncertainty in northeastern Iowa, it 
is of interest to see how these compare with decisions actually made by 
farmers in the same situation. 
For this purpose use was made of data from a random sample of 72 
farmers in Bremer and Fayette counties in ICYT District 6. The information 
Table 6. Optimal decisions concerning fertilizer use in northeastern Iowa-
Decision Farmer alternative Possible returns ($/acre) Maximum 
criterion selected Minimum Maximum Average regret 
Uncertainty model 
ffald A1 -- 0 lbs. N/acre 27.36 104.76 ' 64.08 8.52 
Savage A1 — 0 lbs. N/acre 27.36 104.76 64.08 8.52 
Laplace A3 — 80 lbs. N/acre 13.44 126.48 69.52 13.92 
Hurwicz (.67 < A < 1) A1 -- 0 lbs. N/acre 27.36 104.76 64.08 8.52 
(.38 < A < .67) A2 — 40 lbs. N/acre 18.00 123.72 68.12 9.36 
(0 < A < .38) A3 — 80 lbs. N/acre 13.44 126.48 69.52 13.92 
Risk model 
Maximize expected return A3 --80 lbs.N/acre 13.44 126.48 63.65 13.92 
79 
covered the period 1954-1962 and included 218 decisions made by these 
farmers with respect to rates of nitrogen application to corn. If it 
is assumed that these farmers considered the possible variation in returns 
when deciding on their fertilizer programs, and in some way visualized 
the uncertainty situation as it is set out in the above game analysis, then 
the decisions they made may be meaningfully classified according to the 
criteria of choice they suggest. 
To classify the decisions in this way, a certain amount of aggregation 
was necessary. The game decisions are given in terms of three distinct 
levels of nitrogen use, 0, 40, and 80 pounds per acre, whereas the farmer 
decisions included many application rates intermediate between these 
levels. For purposes of classification therefore, each farmer rate was 
considered as being that one of the three levels to which it was nearest. 
Thus, farmer use of nitrogen within the range 0-20 pounds per acre was 
considered as 0 pounds, 21-60 pounds as 40 pounds, and 61-100 pounds as 
80 pounds per acre. This somewhat broad aggregation was necessitated by 
the original analytical data of the game which permitted only incomplete 
specification of farmer alternatives. 
The classification of the 218 farmer decisions is shown in Table 7. 
It may be seen that almost half of the decisions made (48.6 per cent) 
appear to suggest the application of a Wald, Savage or "pessimistic" 
Hurwicz strategy on the part of the decision maker. If the assumptions 
made are true, then the implication is that many farmers react in a 
conservative way to the uncertainty which' faces them in crop production. 
A quite small percentage of decisions (14.2 per cent) appear to have been 
80 
Table 7. Farmer decisions concerning nitrogen fertilization of 
northeastern Iowa 
corn in 
Farmer 
alternative 
Decision 
criterion 
Number of 
decisions 
Per cent 
of total 
A^ - 0 lbs. Wald, Savage, 
Hurwicz(.67 < a < 1) 
106 48.6 % 
Ag - 40 lbs. Hurwicz(.38 < a < .67) 74 33.9 % 
A3 - 80 lbs. Hurwicz(0 < a < .38), 
Laplace, Maximize 
expected value 
31 14.2 % 
> 100 lbs. - — 7 
218 
3.2 % 
made with less concern for short run outcomes but rather as though farmers 
were attempting to maximize expected net returns (either under uncertainty 
or risk) , or else were making decisions with an optimistic outlook. 3.2 
per cent of the farmer decisions were made to apply over 100 pounds of 
nitrogen per acre. As a distinct farmer alternative, this level was not 
included in the game analysis and therefore it cannot be associated with 
a specific decision criterion. One can only hypothesize that such 
decisions might have been motivated by strong optimism on the part of 
the farmer with respect to the clemency of the weather. 
Of the 72 farmers studied, 17 were consistent over the period in 
applying the Wald/Savage/Hurwicz "pessimistic" criterion to all their 
fertilizer decisions, and adopted alternative every time. Five farmers 
consistently used a Hurwicz "unoptimistic unpessimistic" approach and 
selected Ag, while only one farmer adopted A3 every time as though he 
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were applying a Laplace/optimistic Hurwicz/expected value criterion. The 
other 49 farmers did not consistently apply any one criterion for every 
decision they made, but changed their strategy and their fertilizer level 
over time. Thus, of the 23 farmers who appeared to repeatedly apply one 
criterion, by far the largest number selected the zero level of nitrogen 
fertilization. This reinforces the idea that a great many farmers are 
cautious in their reactions to the inherent uncertainties of crop produc­
tion, and that the Wald and other conservative decision criteria seem 
to dominate their decision making. 
It should be emphasized that the above statements are not meant to 
suggest that farmers actually applied the formal decision criteria their 
actions suggested, but rather that their decisions were made in accordance 
with the stated criteria. If they viewed the decision situation as one 
in which the outcomes of their actions were dependent on an uncertain 
state of Nature, approximately in terms of the game outline presented 
earlier, then one can say that they did either formally apply the relevant 
decision criteria or acted as though they did. It is quite possible, 
of course, that the farmers did not have the knowledge necessary to 
base their decisions on a game theoretic approach to the problem. In 
this case their selection of nitrogen application rates might have been 
governed by lack of knowledge, misinformation, habit, or a multitude of 
other subjective considerations. Although the conclusion was drawn from 
the dominance of low nitrogen rates that farmers reacted conservatively 
to weather uncertainty, it might well have been that mere imperfect 
knowledge with respect to nitrogen fertilizers and their effects on corn 
production caused the apparent conservative behavior. 
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B. Nitrogen Application to Corn in Southern Iowa 
1. The problem analysis 
An analysis similar to the one previous was conducted using data 
from corn production in southern Iowa. The area under study was ICYT 
District 11, for which a weather index had been calculated and for which 
agronomic data were available. The data on corn yields and nitrogen 
fertilizer rates were obtained from experiments conducted on the Grundy-
Shelby and Pasture Experimental Farms in this area of Iowa. The decision 
problem was formulated in the same way as before, and therefore a full 
discussion of the procedure will not be repeated. Again the same assump­
tions with respect to the simplification of a complex problem to "con­
sidered" sets of farmer alternatives and states of Nature were made. 
a. The states of Nature To identify the relevant states of 
Nature -- bad, average and good weather [Sj^Sg.Sg] — the calculated 
weather index for ICYT District 11 was examined, and three years having 
low, average and high values for the index were selected as epitomizing 
the range of weather conditions a farmer must face. The worst weather 
occurred in 1955 when the index was as low as 56. Average weather char­
acterized the year 1960 with an index of 100, while good weather was 
experienced in 1952, the index being 140, The states of Nature were thus 
identified in terms of the weather indices which characterized three past 
years. 
b. The farmer alternatives The farmer alternatives considered 
were four in number: zero, 20, 40, and 60 pounds of nitrogen per acre, 
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these being the nitrogen treatments used in the corn production experi­
ments . The notation , Ag, Ag, A^ will be used to identify these four 
alternatives. 
c. The payoff matrix Experimental corn yields under the four 
levels of nitrogen for the years 1955, 1960 and 1952 were deflated by 15 
per cent to introduce the effects of harvesting losses under farm con­
ditions. The farmer-Nature payoff matrix, in terms of bushels of corn 
per acre, was then constructed from the deflated experimental yields. Thus 
all the elements necessary for constructing the decision problem in the 
form of a game against Nature were available. The formulation of the game 
is summarized in Table 8. 
For a farmer whose objectives are specified in terms of monetary 
rather than physical quantities, the game analysis must be conducted on 
the net revenue payoff matrix of Table 10. This was derived as before, 
first by determining the gross values of the possible yield outcomes (Table 
9) and then subtracting the nitrogen costs associated with each farmer 
alternative. The comparability of net revenues is based on the assumption 
that all production costs (apart from nitrogen) are the same for each 
yield outcome; the net revenues are then to pay these costs and any farmer 
profits that accrue. 
d. The game solutions Upon applying the different decision 
criteria to the payoff matrix of Table 10, some very interesting results 
are found. Using a Wald strategy in order to maximize his minimum gain, 
a farmer would find that alternative Ag (40 pounds per acre) is his 
optimal choice. Even with the worst weather he is assured of at least 
Table 8. The formulation of the game against Nature 
States of Nature : S% -- Bad weather ; e.g. 1955, weather index = 56 
Sg — Average weather ; e.g. 1960, weather index = 100 
Sg -- Good weather ; e.g. 1952, weather index = 140 
Farmer alternatives: A^ — Apply 0 lbs. nitrogen per acre .. 
Ag -- Apply 20 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
Ag -- Apply 40 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
A^ -- Apply 60 lbs. nitrogen per acre 
Farmer-Nature payoff matrix (bushels of corn per acre) 
Experimental yields deflated 15% to bring them to on-farm levels 
Farmer alternatives 
States of Nature 
S1 S2 S3 
A1 35.9 51.3 81.8 
a2 43.7 63.8 82.6 
A3 55.0 65.3 84.4 
A4 18.4 67.2 96.2 
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Table 9. Gross revenue matrix* (in dollars per acre) 
States of Nature 
Farmer alternatives S1 S2 S3 
A1 
43.08 61.56 98.16 
A2 52.44 76.56 99.12 
A3 66.00 78.36 101.28 
A4 22.08 80.64 115.44 
aCorn price assumed to be $1.20 per bushel. 
Table 10. Net revenue matrix8 (in dollars per acre) 
States of Nature 
Farmer alternatives S1 S2 S3 
A1 43.08 61.56 98.16 
A2 49.44 73.56 96.12 
A3 60.00 72.36 95.28 
A4 
13.08 71.64 106.44 
aCorn price assumed to be $1.20 per bushel 
Nitrogen price assumed to be 15f per pound 
Cost associated with alternative A^ — $0 
Cost associated with alternative Ag — $3.00 
Cost associated with alternative Ag — $6.00 
Cost associated with alternative A^ — $9.00. 
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$60.00 net return per acre, and no other alternative can guarantee him 
this level. 
From the Savage regret matrix of Table 11 it can be seen that by 
adopting alternative the farmer is assured that the maximum regret 
he may feel when the outcome of his decision becomes known will be lower 
than that he may experience under any other alternative action. For 
those farmers whose concern lies in minimizing their ex post "dissatis­
factions" in this way, an application of 20 pounds of nitrogen is optimal. 
Table 11. The Savage regret matrix 
Farmer alternatives 
States of Nature 
Si Sg S g 
Maximum 
regret 
A1 16.92 12.00 8.28 16.92 
a2 10.56 0 10.32 10.56* 
A3 0 1.20 11.16 11.16 
A4 46.92 1.92 0 46.92 
^Minimum maximum regret. 
In applying the Laplace criterion, an equal probability of occurrence 
(here l/3) is assigned to each state of Nature and the expected value of 
returns for each farmer alternative is computed. Using this approach 
alternative Ag would be selected, its expected value of $75.08 being higher 
than for any other course of action. 
The Hurwicz criterion selects that action having the highest 0C* index. 
Where a for the decision maker lies between zero and 0.19, alternative A4 
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has the higher 0$* index and would thus be selected by this optimistic 
decision maker. In any instance where 0.19 < a < 1, Ag is the best course 
of action ; at the point where the decision maker's value of a exactly 
equals 0.19 he would be indifferent between Ag and A^. It appears that 
alternatives A^ and A^ are never selected by the Hurwicz criterion. 
It is again possible to transform this decision problem under 
uncertainty into one of risk by applying probabilities of occurrence to 
each state of Nature. Over the 20-year period 1942-1961, the mean 
weather index for this District was 102. If values of the index within 
a range of 25 around this mean value are still accepted within the category 
of "average weather", then the states of Nature can be more generally 
defined in the following way; a weather index < 90 constitutes bad 
weather, 90-114 constitutes average weather and > 114 constitutes good 
weather. Estimated probabilities of occurrence may then be assigned to 
these states of Nature from examination of the historical series of weather 
index values. 
During the 20 years examined, 4 years had index values < 90, 10 had 
values within the range 90-114 and 6 had index values > 114. The probabil­
ities of occurrence 'of the three states of Nature [S^.SgjSg] were thus 
[0.2,0,5,0.3]. Each outcome in the payoff matrix of Table 10 was multi­
plied by its probability and the new payoff matrix for decision making 
under risk was derived. The farmer alternative having the highest total 
expected outcome is the optimal course of action for a maximizing farmer. 
As can be seen from Table 12, this is alternative Ag. 
A comparative summary of the theoretical solutions to the nitrogen 
fertilizer decision problem in southern Iowa is given in Table 13. 
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Table 12. The payoff matrix for decision making under risk (in dollars 
per acre) 
Farmer 
alternatives (P^2) 
States of Nature 
S2 
(p2=-5) 
S3 
<P3=.3) 
Row totals 
(expected returns) 
A1 8.62 30.78 29.45 68.85 
A2 9.89 36.78 28.84 75.51 
A3 12.00 36.18 28.58 76.76* 
A4 2.72 35.82 31.93 70.47 
^Maximum expected return. 
The results of this game analysis differ in some important respects 
from the results obtained for the northeastern Iowa fertilizer decision 
problem. The most noticeable difference is that, in southern Iowa, it 
appears that no rational decision maker should fail to apply nitrogen to 
his corn. Even the highly conservative Wald criterion selects a 40 pounds 
per acre application rate, suggesting that even the most cautious farmer 
should apply this level. In contrast, the most cautious farmer in north­
eastern Iowa is advised not to apply any nitrogen if he wishes to maximize 
his minimum gain. This difference might be explained on the basis of 
differing inherent soil fertility levels in the two areas. In northeastern 
Iowa the nitrogen status of the soil is quite high due to the high content 
of organic matter; hence the yield responses to extra nitrogen applied by 
the farmers are low, especially under adverse weather conditions. On the 
other hand, in southern Iowa where the inherent soil nitrogen status is 
somewhat lower, yield responses to applied nitrogen are higher ; and it 
Table 13. Optimal decisions concerning fertilizer use in southern Iowa 
Decision Farmer alternative Possible returns ($/acre) Maximum 
criterion selected Minimum . Maximum Average regret 
Uncertainty model 
Wald A3 " 40 lbs. N/acre 60.00 95.28 75.08 11.16 
Savage A2 -- 20 lbs. N/acre 49.44 96.12 73.04 10.56 
Laplace A3 " 40 lbs. N/acre 60.00 95.28 75.08 11.16 
Hurwicz 
(.19 < a < 1) A3 " 40 lbs. N/acre 60.00 95.28 75.08 11.16 
(0 < a < .19) A4 " 60 lbs. N/acre 13.08 106.44 63.72 46.92 
model 
Maximize expected return A3 "" 40 lbs. N/acre 60.00 95.28 75.08 11.16 
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appears that even when bad weather prevails the responses are high enough 
to make at least a certain level of nitrogen application profitable. This 
may be one reason to explain why the two widely differing nitrogen rates 
are indicated for conservative decision makers in the two areas. 
If one were asked to make a judgement as to the "best" level of 
nitrogen application to corn in southern Iowa, it would appear from the 
game analysis that farmer alternative A^, 40 pounds of nitrogen per acre, 
should be selected. Given the conditions of imperfect knowledge of future 
weather conditions, this level satisfies the requirements of the conserva­
tive farmer who desires some certain minimum return; it is also the optimal 
level for the farmer concerned with long run profit maximization, whether 
he views the decision situation as one of uncertainty or of risk. 
2. Comparison with actual farmer decisions 
In order to compare theoretical and farmer decisions with respect to 
nitrogen fertilizer use on corn in southern Iowa, data from a random 
sample of 32 farmers from Wayne County were used. Wayne County is part 
of ICYT District 11 and so the game theoretic analysis shown for this area 
should be relevant for the farmers in the sample. The sample data covered 
the years 1955-1962 and included information on 78 nitrogen fertilizer 
decisions made during this period. Each decision was classified under 
one of the four farmer alternatives and the apparent use of the different 
criteria in farmer decision making was determined. 
Again it was necessary to aggregate the decisions somewhat in order 
to classify them, and this was done on the same principle as for the last 
problem, as follows: 
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0-10 pounds per acre was considered as alternative — 0 pounds 
11-30 pounds per acre was considered as alternative Ag -- 20 pounds 
31-50 pounds per acre was considered as alternative Ag — 40 pounds 
51-70 pounds per acre was considered as alternative A^ -- 60 pounds 
Categorizing farmer actions in this way, and relating them to the 
decision criteria applied in the game analysis, the results shown in Table 
14 were obtained. 
Table 14. Farmer decisions concerning nitrogen fertilization of corn in 
southern Iowa 
Farmer 
alternative 
Decision 
criterion 
Number of 
decisions 
Per cent 
of total 
A^ — 0 lbs. — — 54 69.2 % 
Ag -~ 20 lbs. Savage 8 10.3 7. 
Ag — 40 lbs. Wald, Laplace 
Hurwicz (.19 < a < 1) 
Maximize expected value 
7 9.0 7. 
A^ — 60 lbs. Hurwicz (0 < OC < .19) 4 5.1 7. 
> 70 lbs. - - 5 
78 
6.4 7. 
It is immediately obvious from these results that, as in northeastern 
Iowa, a zero level of nitrogen application is most common. Here, 69.2 
per cent of all decisions made selected a farmer alternative which satis­
fied none of the optimality criteria applied in the game. According to 
the problem analysis, such actions are sub-optimal. Higher levels of 
minimum or average return and lower levels of maximum regret could have 
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been attained by the use of at least some nitrogen; and the Hurwicz s 
criterion suggests that even the most pessimistic decision maker would 
not adopt a zero level of application. From this it would appear that the 
cautious or conservative behavior of farmers when deciding on their 
fertilizer programs probably stems from lack of knowledge of the yield 
increasing effects of nitrogen, even under adverse weather conditions. 
Obviously many of the farmers sampled did not visualize the decision situ­
ation in the same framework as it was represented here, or else they 
applied some other unspecified decision criterion. 
At the other end of the range of farmer alternatives, 6.4 per cent 
of all decisions were made to apply over 70 pounds of nitrogen per acre. 
This level was outside the boundaries of the problem considered, but 
presumably implies a high level of optimism on the part of the decision 
maker with respect to good weather and response to nitrogen. 
Of the 78 decisions made, only 19 (24.4 per cent) suggest the appli­
cation of decision criteria within a game theoretic framework such as 
employed here; that is, only 19 decisions were made selecting alternatives 
Ag, Ag, or A^ which are in some sense optimal for the game. 
The farmer decision comparisons conducted in this chapter were made 
in an attempt to determine whether farmer's actions suggested the use of 
a game theoretic approach in visualizing and solving a decision problem 
under conditions of uncertainty. The results of these comparisons indicate 
that, rather than reacting to uncertainty and applying decision rules to 
optimize under these conditions, many farmers may be just totally unaware 
of, or uninterested in, the profit-making possibilities of nitrogen 
application to corn. The predominance of very low nitrogen rates may 
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mean that the imperfection of farmer knowledge includes a general un-
awareness of their possible courses of action and outcomes, in addition 
to an ignorance concerning the occurrence of a specific state of Nature. 
Such a lack of technical knowledge may induce many farmers to apply no 
nitrogen in order to be "on the safe side". 
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IX. LIVESTOCK MARKETING UNDER CONDITIONS OF PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
By its very nature agriculture is subject to great uncertainties 
with respect to the output obtained from given input factors. Being a 
biological production process, a multitude of uncontrollable, and perhaps 
unknown, natural or biological phenomena exert an influence on the yield 
of crops, the production of milk, the growth in size and quality of 
livestock, etc. Variations in the levels of these uncontrollable factors 
result in variations in supply from one period to another ; and in the 
face of a generally inelastic demand for farm products, these supply 
changes are the cause of wide fluctuations in prices. Thus, there is 
another type of uncertainty a farmer must contend with — uncertainty with 
respect to price. Not only does he have ex ante imperfect knowledge of 
the physical yields of his enterprises; also, when he finally has a given 
amount of product to sell, his returns from this are uncertain. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to demonstrate the usefulness of 
a game theoretic framework for decision making under conditions where price 
is the major uncertainty variable. Both examples studied are drawn from 
the area of livestock marketing. The situation analyzed is that wherein 
a farmer has fattened an animal up to a weight which is still fairly 
low, but at which it is acceptable to the market. The decision problem 
facing him is this: should he sell the animal now, or fatten it on to a 
higher weight? And if he carries it on, at what weight should he finally 
sell the finished beast? His decision must revolve around a consideration 
of the possible returns from selling now as opposed to the possible 
returns (less additional costs) of selling at the higher weights. In all 
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this, the farmer's costs of extending the animal's keep are assumed to 
be known with certainty, but at each marketing weight he faces a series 
of possible prices, the occurrence of any particular one being an uncertain 
event. 
To analyze this problem in the form of a game against Nature, a set 
of farmer alternatives, a set of states of Nature, and the corresponding 
matrix of outcomes must be identified. Dillon (14) has reasoned that 
it is the actions of all livestock farmers en masse that affect livestock 
prices; and insofar as agriculture is mostly pure competition (i.e. no bloc 
of farmers unites to affect prices against the best interest of another 
farmer or farmers), then the price structure may be considered as compris­
ing the set of states of Nature facing a decision maker. This, in other 
words, means that the prices a farmer may receive for his livestock are 
not manipulated by a malevolent opponent, but rather that they are con­
trolled by an impersonal Nature to whom no objectives may be ascribed. 
Thus, in the decision problems considered here, the states of Nature may 
be validly represented in terms of possible livestock price levels. 
The farmer's alternative courses of action are represented by a set 
of distinct marketing weights at which the fattened animals might con­
ceivably be sold. Depending on the increment in weight separating each 
alternative, a very large number of possible farmer actions can be 
identified. However, in line with the process of simplification advocated 
for solving farmer decision problems, the considered set of alternatives 
is limited here to a number small enough for most farmers to handle. The 
exact number in each case is governed by the number of weight classes 
covered by the price data used in the analysis. 
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Given the possible farmer marketing weights and the costs and prices 
relevant to each, the matrix of outcomes can be computed and the decision 
problem solved in game form. 
At this point, the procedure used for specifying the states of Nature 
in both problem analyses of this chapter deserves closer attention. Dur­
ing any marketing period there exists a range of prices for a given class 
of finished livestock. Thus, whenever selling his livestock a farmer 
may receive the high price for the period, the low price for the period, 
or any other price within these limits. Let it be assumed that the farmer 
simplifies this price spectrum to consider but three representative 
components — a low, an average, and a high price. Further, let it be 
supposed that he considers three possible alternative courses of action 
(marketing weights), denoted by Aj_, Ag, and A^. Then, when preparing to 
sell his livestock at Aj he is unsure whether he will receive a high, 
average or low price for them. Similarly, the prices he will receive 
selling at A^ or A^ are unknown. Thus, whatever alternative he selects 
his returns are always an uncertain quantity. 
Added to this is another uncertainty arising out of the fact that 
the farmer alternatives imply different intervals in time as well as in 
weight; the implementation of alternative A^ must come"at a later date 
than that at which A^ could be implemented, which in turn must come later 
than A]y If the farmer rejects the chance of selling at A% he will incur 
further feeding costs and perhaps sell later at Ag. Had he sold at A^ 
he might have received a high price and high returns, yet when he sells 
at Ag his selling price and consequent returns may be low. In such a case 
97 
he would have foregone the possibility of obtaining a good profit and 
received instead a low one. On the other hand, it might be that the 
farmer would have received only the low price at while at Ag he 
receives the high price, thus reaping a good profit by delaying his mar­
ketings. This is the type of uncertainty with which such marketing prob­
lems' are fraught. The decision maker does not know what price (and what 
returns) he will receive for any considered action; and when he has 
decided upon a particular course of action he does not know what he would 
have received had he selected a different alternative. Before making 
his decision he only knows what his returns might be for each action, 
depending on which of the possible prices his livestock may fetch. Placed 
in such a situation, he wishes to select a marketing weight that is an 
optimum in terms of his specific objectives. 
Based on the above reasoning, the states of Nature are determined in 
terms of what prices might be upon selling now and what they might be 
upon selling later. Each state of Nature will be denoted in the symbolic 
form "NjTk". N stands for "now" and T stands for "then"; j indicates a 
possible price level upon selling now, while k is the possible price 
received when selling then (meaning at a later date). It was assumed that 
the decision maker simplified the range of possible prices and considered 
it only in terms of low, average or high prices (denoted as L, A or H). 
Thus, j and k may take any of the values L, A or H. 
For example, one state of Nature is denoted by NLTL. This means "now 
low, then low" and indicates the possibility of the farmer selling (now) 
under alternative A% at a low price, and receiving also a low price should 
he instead sell later (then) at A2 or A3. Similarly, the state NHTA 
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indicates that were the farmer to sell (now) at A^ he would receive a high 
price, but were he to sell later (then) at Ag or Ag he would receive an 
average price. 
There being 3 possible price levels when selling "now" and 3 pos­
sible price levels when selling "then", a set of 9 states of Nature can 
be specified. This set is expressed as: [NLTL, NLTA, NLTH, NATL, NATA, 
NATH, NHTL, NHTA, NHTH]. From the explanation of the generalized form 
of representing a state of Nature, the meaning of each state in the above 
set should be self-explanatory. 
Two decision problems are analyzed in this chapter, one concerning 
the marketing of hogs and the other concerning cattle marketing. In 
each case it is assumed that the farmer has some objectives which can be 
represented in monetary terms, and that he wishes to determine the best 
marketing weight which allows him to attain these objectives as closely 
as possible. Such a problem is readily adaptable to a game theoretic 
analysis, and it is suggested that the examples shown here have practical 
relevance at the farm level. Comparisons of theoretical and actual farmer 
decisions are again made in an attempt to see how farmers have reacted to 
the uncertainty of livestock marketing situations, and whether their 
actions imply the use of a game theoretic approach. 
A. Determining the Optimum Marketing Weight of Fat Hogs 
1. The problem analysis 
A hog could conceivably be sold for the pork market at any weight 
from 170 pounds to 350 pounds. Somewhere within this range is a theoret­
ically optimal weight at which point marginal costs and revenues are 
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equated; this is the maximum profit marketing weight under conditions of 
static prices and perfect knowledge. In reality, however, knowledge is 
usually highly imperfect and prices are far from being static. Ex ante, 
the hog farmer cannot plan his operations to precisely meet these marginal 
conditions at each point in time and thus absolutely maximize his profits. 
In the face of uncertainty he must settle for some lower order objectives 
and try to attain these as closely as possible. By applying game 
theoretic procedures to analyze the uncertainty of marketing situations, 
he may determine which is the "best" marketing weight in terms of these 
objectives. 
a. The farmer alternatives For the example shown here, the price 
data available distinguished three classes of hog weights, and on the 
basis of these data three farmer alternatives were specified. These 
alternatives assumed that hogs might be sold at a weight of less than 200 
pounds, between 200 and 255 pounds, or over 255 pounds. From a random sam­
ple of 155 hog farmers in Iowa it was found that the average weight of 
hog marketings in the first class was 187 pounds. In the second weight 
class the mean marketing weight was 235 pounds, while in the third class 
the mean weight was 270 pounds. These then become the more ..specific con­
sidered farmer alternatives [A% ,Ag ,Ag], being the set of marketing 
weights [187,235,270]. 
b. The states of Nature Nine states of Nature were identified 
as explained previously, each representing the occurrence of a particular 
price level "now" and a particular price level "then". The decision 
problem is assumed to be faced at the time when the first alternative 
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(A^ — sell at 187 pounds) must be selected if that action is to be taken 
at all — that is, when the hogs in question already weigh 187 pounds. 
Thus, the price level "now" represents the price received upon selling 
at 187 pounds, while the price level "then" is the price received upon 
selling at Ag (235 pounds) or A3 (270 pounds) as the case may be. 
The possible price levels at each marketing weight may be either low 
(L), average (A) or high (H). The basic price data used in the analysis 
were low, average and high prices of hogs in each of the three weight 
classes ( < 200 pounds, 200-255 pounds, > 255 pounds) sold at Chicago (16). 
The possible low price for each marketing weight was derived by computing 
a 5-year average of the mean monthly low prices for that marketing weight. 
Similarly, the possible average and high prices for each weight were 5-year 
averages of mean monthly average and high prices respectively. The farmer 
marketing decisions studied in the later comparisons were made in 1960, 
and the relevant 5-year period for computing expected prices was therefore 
taken to be 1955-1959. 
The use of a 5-year period may seem somewhat arbitrary, but it appears 
to be a convenient length of time over which the memory of many farmers 
extends. It is also short enough to allow for a flexible rather than a 
constant trend in a price series (10, p. 739), and may therefore be a 
suitable farmer model for forming price expectations in livestock market­
ing situations. 
c. The payoff matrix The first step in the problem analysis is 
to compute the matrix of outcomes facing the farmer. For each marketing 
weight the gross market value of a fat hog under each state of Nature was 
101 
calculated, and the gross revenue matrix so obtained is shown in Table 15. 
It will be noticed that there is a certain symmetry in the rows of this 
matrix. The first three elements of the A% row are of the same value; 
similarly, the second three elements of this row are identical one with 
another, and so are the third three elements. The three distinct values 
are the gross returns from selling "now" at either a low, average or high 
price. In each of the rows Ag and A3 the first three elements are un-
identical, and this triple is then repeated twice in the row. The three 
distinct values here are the gross returns from selling at the heavier 
weight (i.e. "then") under either low, average or high prices. The three 
values are repeated along the row because such returns may be received 
"then" when prices "now" might have been low, or average, or high. 
Next, account must be taken of the extra costs associated with carry­
ing hogs on to weights higher than 187 pounds. For this purpose, use 
was made of a table of "break-even" prices given by Heady and Jensen (25, 
p. 317). Based upon an assumed corn price of $1.20 per bushel, the costs 
involved in fattening a hog from 187-235 pounds were computed to be $6.74, 
while the cost of fattening from 187-270 pounds was $11.56. Upon sub­
tracting these costs from the gross revenues under Ag and A3 respectively, 
one obtains the net revenue matrix upon which the final game analysis is 
conducted. 
This latter payoff matrix may be somewhat simplified, without altering 
the solution of the game in,any way, by subtracting a constant from each 
element. The lowest net return under alternative A^ is $24.46; when this 
amount is subtracted from each element of the net revenue matrix, the 
simplified net revenue matrix of Table 16 is finally derived. This shows 
Table 15. Gross revenue matrix for hog marketing decisions (in dollars per hog) 
Farmer 
alterna­
tives NLTL NLTA NLTH 
States 
NATL 
of Nature 
NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 24.46 24.46 24.46 31.17 31.17 31.17 34.89 34.89 34.89 
A2 37.01 40.49 44.27 37.01 40.49 44.27 37.01 40.49 44.27 
A3 38.18 44.04 50.00 38.18 44.04 50.00 38.18 44.04 50.00 
Table 16. Simplified net revenue matrix for hog marketing decisions (in dollars per hog) 
Farmer 
alterna­
tives NLTL NLTA NLTH 
States 
NATL 
of Nature 
NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 0 0 0 , 6.61 6.61 6.61 10.43 10.43 10.43 
A2 5.81 9.29 13.07 5.81 9.29 13.07 5.81 9.29 13.07 
A3 1.16 8.02 13.98 1.16 8.02 13.98 1.16 8.02 13.98 
103 
the net returns the farmer may receive from each alternative action as 
compared to selling "now" at a low price. Each alternative is then 
evaluated by the different decision criteria in terms of how well it 
compares with selling at 187 pounds for a possible low price. 
d. The game solutions Upon applying the decision criterion 
appropriate to his individual situation, each farmer is able to determine 
that marketing weight which for him is optimal. The Wald criterion would 
indicate that alternative Ag should be selected; by marketing at 235 
pounds the minimum gain would not be lower than $5.81 per hog. If alter­
native Ag were selected and the hogs sold at 270 pounds, .the minimum gain 
might be as low as $1.16; while, by definition of the matrix elements, 
the minimum return possible under A^ would be $0. 
The Savage regret criterion selects alternative Ag also. From the 
regret matrix in Table 17, the maximum regret under Ag is only $4.62 per 
hog, as compared with $13.98 for A^ and $9.27 for Ag. 
Table 17. Savage regret matrix3 
Farmer 
alter­
natives NLTL NLTA NLTH 
States 
NATL 
of Nature 
NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 5.81 9.29 13.98 0 2". 68 7.37 0 0 3.55 
A2 0 0 .91 .80 0 .91 4.62 1.14 .41 
A3 4.65 1.27 0 5.45 1.27 0 9.27 2.41 0 
^Minimum maximum regret, 4.62, is associated with A^ 
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Where each state of Nature is considered equally likely then a prob­
ability of occurrence of 1/9 can be attached to each. If the hog farmer 
visualized the market situation in this way and wishes to maximize his 
expected return, he would again market at Ag, 235 pounds. Under a Laplace 
approach like this, the expected return over a series of marketings 
would be $9.39 per hog; this is higher than the return that could be 
expected from either of the other alternatives, namely, $5.68 under 
and $7.72 under A3. 
For a farmer who views the market situation with a high level of 
optimism, whose value of CZ lies between zero and 0.16, the Hurwicz 
criterion selects alternative Ag as optimal. Saving a very low pessimism 
index he would prefer to fatten his hogs to the higher weight in the 
expectation of gaining the highest returns. However, for those farmers 
whose optimism does not reach this level, and for whom .16 < 06 < 1, 
alternative A^ appears to offer more opportunity for gaining highest 
returns. 
There appears to be little possibility of objectively transforming 
this problem into one of decision making under risk, and then seeking that 
alternative which maximizes expected returns under these conditions. 
Determining the objective probability of, say, selling at 235 pounds for 
a high price when only a low price would have been received had the hogs 
been sold at 187 pounds (i.e. determining the probability of the outcome 
for Ag under the state of Nature NLTH) would be virtually an impossible 
task. However, the individual decision maker may assign his own subjective 
probabilities to each relevant state of Nature, and then proceed to select 
his optimal decision in a situation of subjective risk. 
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The theoretically optimal decisions derived from this game analysis 
are summarized in Table 18. 
From these results it would appear that farmer alternative Ag is gen­
erally the best decision to make, in the sense that it satisfies all but 
one of the decision criteria with respect to an optimum. Alternative A^, 
on the other hand, satisfies none of the criteria. It is not an inferior 
alternative, in the sense of being dominated by some other alternative. 
But as can be seen from Table 16, a hog sold at 187 pounds will yield 
greatest returns only if sold for an average price when a low price would 
have been received later (NATL); or if it is sold for a high price, and 
a low or average price would have been received later (NHTL or NHTA). 
Thus in 6 cases out of 9, (that is, for 6 of the 9 states of Nature) it 
is always better to fatten a hog on to a higher weight. 
2. Comparison with actual farmer decisions 
From a random sample of farmers who were members of the Iowa Farm 
Business Association in 1960, the records of 155 farmers were selected. 
For each farmer the mean weight at which he sold his fat hogs during that 
Table 18. Optimal decisions concerning hog marketing under price 
uncertainty 
Farmer 
Decision alternative Possible returns ($/hog) Maximum 
criterion selected Minimum Maximum Average regret 
Wald, Savage A2 5.81 13.07 9.39 4.62 
Laplace 
Hurwicz(.16 <(%<!) 
Hurwicz(0 < à < .16) Ag 1.16 13.98 7.72 9.27 
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year was classified into one of three groupings, < 200 pounds, 200-255 
pounds, and > 255 pounds. For each grouping a mean of marketing weights 
was computed, weighted by the number of hogs sold by each farmer; the 
number of farmers who sold hogs in each weight class was also recorded. 
The mean weights for each class were those that have already been used to 
specify farmer alternatives in the foregoing analysis — that is, 187 
pounds, 235 pounds, and 270 pounds. 
The comparison of the marketing weight decisions made by the 155 
farmers and the theoretically optimal decisions is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. Farmer decisions concerning hog marketing weights 
Farmer 
alternative 
Decision 
criterion 
Number of 
decisions 
Per cent 
of total 
Mean number 
of hogs sold 
per farmer 
A1 — 187 lbs. 5 3.2% . 540 
A2 — 235 lbs. Wald, Savage, 
Laplace, 
Hurwicz(.19 < (X < 1) 
. 110 71.0% 339 
A3 — 270 lbs. Hurwicz (0 < a < .19) 40 
155 
25.8% 340 
From this it is immediately obvious that a large majority of the 
farmers (71 per cent) acted in a way compatible with many of the dictates 
of the game theoretic problem analysis. Alternative A^ is appropriate for 
decision makers who are concerned with assuring some short run level of 
return, and for those who concentrate on achieving longer run maximization 
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of returns. Thus, both types may be included in the 110 farmers who 
marketed their hogs at 235 pounds. The 25.8 per cent of farmers who 
sold at 270 pounds would appear to have been motivated by strong optimism 
with respect to the level of prices they would receive for hogs of this 
weight. Only a very small number of farmers chose the alternative, 
which was sub-optimal according to the analysis here. However, unknown 
subjective considerations on the part of these individuals may have led 
them to feel this was thejLr best alternative. From the sample used for 
this comparison it appears that the farmers with the larger hog herds 
preferred alternative A^, although because of the limitations of the sample 
this observation may not be of any significance. Overall, of the total 
number of hogs sold by the 155 farmers under study, the mean marketing 
weight was 241 pounds; this very closely approximates the selling weight 
at Ag, suggesting that farmers as à whole are acting in a way compatible 
with the model. 
This analysis has shown how a farmer, faced with unpredictable price 
conditions, may logically and systematically determine which of a variety 
of different marketing weights may be best for him. Many criticisms 
may be levelled at the example demonstrated here, not the least of which 
are that the range of alternatives considered is too limited, and that it 
is not completely realistic to conduct the analysis on an annual basis. 
In answer to the first of these criticisms, it must be said that it was 
possible to consider only three farmer alternatives because of the nature 
of the price data available. Ideally, a farmer framing his decision prob­
lem in this way might consider courses of action differentiated by perhaps 
a 25-pound weight increment, such as marketing weights of 185, 210, 235, 
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260, and 285 pounds. In this case, five instead of three alternatives 
make up the farmer's considered set, but the problem analysis would not 
be unduly more complex. However, there is a need for price data to be 
made available in a form that will allow an analysis in this detail. 
With respect to the second of the critical points raised, there is 
no doubt but that this analysis would have more realism had it been 
related to some more specific date. Within any one year there exists a 
trend in average hog prices which can be fairly well predicted. Thus, 
most farmers would know that hog prices in general rise to a peak in 
February, reach a low in April, peak again at a higher level in August and 
fall again into December and January. This is a well-established seasonal, 
price pattern for hogs, and thus at any particular time of the year the 
relevant range of possible prices would not necessarily coincide with the 
annual average price ranges used here. 
However, in the farmer data used for the comparisons of decisions, 
only an average marketing weight for the whole year could be determined; 
no distinction could be made between marketing weights at one time of the 
year as opposed to another. Therefore,, insofar as annual average weights 
were used, it was thought appropriate to use also annual price data. ÏÏiis, 
of course reduces some of the inherent uncertainty in the marketing situa­
tion, for the different price variation from month to month is averaged 
into a measure of price variation for the whole year. Ideally, a farmer 
would conduct an analysis as shown here every time he has a batch of hogs 
ready to be marketed. He could then incorporate the possible price levels 
which appear relevant for the one or two months ahead, and it may be 
found that the optimum marketing weight at one time of the year differs 
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from that at another time. Nonetheless, the method shown here is thought 
to be a useful framework to use in analyzing such marketing decision prob­
lems . 
B. Determining the Optimum Marketing Weight of Fat Cattle 
The game analysis demonstrated above was applied to a similar problem, 
that of selecting the optimum marketing weight of cattle under conditions 
of price uncertainty. A cattle-feeding enterprise is generally considered 
to be more "risky" than hog-raising, and profits are subject to much wider 
variations. Much depends upon the price at which the feeder cattle are 
purchased, the feeding system practiced, and the weight and price at which 
the finished cattle are finally sold. Though the price of cattle per 
hundredweight may fall while an animal is being fattened from (say) 1,000 
pounds to 1,100 pounds, it is still possible for more profit to be attained 
by selling at the higher weight. If, for instance, an animal might have 
sold for $25.00 per hundredweight at 1,000 pounds, its gross value would 
have been $250.00; if instead it is sold at 1,100 pounds for $24.25 per 
hundredweight, its gross value is $267.75. Then, if the cost of adding 
the extra 100 pounds weight was less than $17.75 the heavier marketing 
weight has been more profitable. However, had the price fallen to $22.75 
at 1,100 pounds the gross value of the fat animal would have been only 
$250.25, making the heavier marketing weight much less profitable than the 
lower weight. Because of such price variation the farmer may reap high 
profits or large losses from the cattle he sells at any particular weight. 
How, then, can he decide on an optimum marketing weight out of the whole 
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range of weights open to him? By analyzing the uncertainty along the 
lines suggested here he can determine what the outcomes will be under 
alternative selling weights and price conditions, and on the basis of 
this select the marketing weight which best suits the attainment of his 
objectives. 
1. The problem analysis 
The situation assumed here is one in which a farmer has a batch of 
cattle at a weight of about 950 pounds per head. He must decide whether 
to sell the cattle now or fatten them to heavier weights and then market 
them. If he is interested in monetary returns then his decision, to be 
rational, must take into account the costs involved in putting more weight 
on the animals, and the possible price conditions at marketing time. 
a. The farmer alternatives On the basis of market price data 
available, the farmer alternatives were distinguished as selling in one 
of four weight classes, viz.: < 1050 pounds, 1051-1200 pounds, 1201-1350 
pounds and > 1350 pounds. From a sample of 115 farmers who sold cattle 
in 1959 the mean marketing weights in each weight class were determined; 
these class means were then used as the specific farmer alternatives for 
the problem analysis. Thus, the set of alternative farmer actions 
[A^,A2,Ag,A^] was taken as the set of marketing weights [979;1,110;1,232; 
1,387] in pounds per head. 
b. The states of Nature The states of Nature, as before, were 
specified in the general form "NjTk"; Nj denotes a possible price that 
would be received by selling "now" (at A^) together with Tk, the possible 
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price received if, instead, the cattle are sold "then" (at A2, A3, or A^). 
The relevant prices faced by the farmer were again simplified to the three 
levels, low (L), average (A), and high (H), the prices being in dollars 
per 100 pounds liveweight. Nine states of Nature can be identified in 
this form, each differing from another in the price received by selling 
"now" and/or the price received on selling "then". The states of Nature 
are: [NLTL, NLTA, NLTH, NATL, NATA, NATH, NHTL, NHTA, NHTH]. 
The prices used in the analysis were computed from the mean monthly 
low, average, and high prices received for cattle in each weight class at 
Chicago (16). Since the decision problem was assumed to be faced in 1959, 
price data from the previous years 1954-1958 were used to derive the 
expected market price levels. For each weight class, 5-year averages of 
the mean monthly, low, average and high prices were computed; these are 
presented in Table 27. 
c. The payoff matrix The only other information necessary for 
the problem analysis is the costs associated with each farmer alternative. 
All costs that were incurred before the cattle achieved a weight of 979 
pounds (A^) are of no interest in the analysis; they must be paid which­
ever of the considered marketing weights is finally selected. It is the 
additional costs of fattening to weights beyond A^ that must enter into 
the decision, for these costs must be weighed against the possible returns 
that might be earned. In order to compute the relevant cost quantities, 
some standard feeding ration had to be assumed. In reality, each individ­
ual decision maker has his own cost function which he would use for his 
problem analysis; for purposes of. analysis here, however, one standard 
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cost function was assumed to apply for every cattle feeder. 
An exponential function, expressing the weight gain of 2-year old 
steers fed from an initial weight of 850 pounds on a ration of corn, 
alfalfa and linseed oilmeal, was used for computing the feed costs. This 
function was (34, p. 63): 
Ï - 4.703! Xi3286 X22350 X'0333 
where Y represents pounds of gain and X^, Xg, and Xg represent pounds of 
corn, alfalfa and linseed oilmeal respectively. A ration composed of X^, 
Xg, and Xg in the ratio 20 pounds : 20 pounds : 1 pound was assumed to be 
fed. The prices of the constituent feedstuffs were taken as 2 cents per 
pound of corn, 1.5 cents per pound of alfalfa and 4 cents per pound of 
linseed oilmeal. An amount equal to 15 per cent of the feed costs was 
added to cover labor, interest and other miscellaneous expenses. 
Using these data, the costs associated with each farmer alternative 
were computed. These were found to be: 
Fattening from 979-1,110 pounds — $28.85, cost associated with Ag 
Fattening from 979-1,232 pounds — $66.58, cost associated with Ag 
Fattening from 979-1,387 pounds — $127.97 cost associated with A^ 
Given all the requisite information, the gross revenue matrix of 
Table 20 was computed; it shows the gross market returns from each farmer 
alternative under each state of Nature. 
The costs associated with each course of action were then subtracted 
from the relevant gross revenues, yielding a matrix of net revenues 
facing the farmer. This matrix was simplified by subtracting from each 
element the market value of an animal sold at A^ for a low price, $166.14. 
The resulting matrix is shown in Table 21; it indicates the additional 
Table 20. Gross revenue matrix for cattle marketing decisions (in dollars per head) 
Farmer States of Nature 
alternative NLTL NLTA NLTH NATL NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 166 .14 166 .14 166 .14 226 .15 226.15 226 .15 272 .16 272 .16 272.16 
A2 199 .58 267 .40 327 .89 199 .58 267.40 327 .89 199 .58 26 7 .40 327.89 
A3 234 .82 306 .15 368 .00 234 .82 306.15 368 .00 234 .82 306 .15 368.00 
A4 291 .96 348 .27 399 .46 291 .96 348.27 399 .46 291 .96 348 .27 399.46 
Table 21. Simplified net revenue matrix for cattle marketing decision (in dollars per head) 
Farmer States of Nature 
alternative NLTL NLTA NLTH NATL NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 0 0 0 60.01 60.01 60.01 106.02 106.02 106.02 
A2 4.59 72.41 132.90 4.59 72.41 132.90 4.59 72.41 132.90 
A3 
2.10 73.43 135.28 2.10 73.43 135.28 2.10 73.43 135.28 
A4 -2.15 54.16 105.35 -2.15 54.16 
105.35 -2.15 54.16 105.35 
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returns a farmer may. receive from each alternative, under each state of 
Nature, compared with selling at 979 pounds for a low price. This is the "" 
relevant payoff matrix for analyzing the decision problem. The greater 
the net returns attained, the greater the sum of money available for paying 
the unspecified production costs up to 979 pounds weight, and the farmer's 
profit. 
d. The game solutions The first thing to notice from this matrix 
is that alternative A^, marketing at 1387 pounds, is an inferior alterna­
tive. Under the price and cost conditions adopted here it would never 
pay to carry fat cattle to this weight. This is not to say that the farmer 
will make no profit at all by selecting this alternative (for the other 
fattening costs incurred prior to a weight of 979 pounds are unknown); 
rather it means that, given any state of Nature, alternatives Ag and Ag 
will always yield higher net returns. For the farmer who is trying to 
maximize some level of returns, A^ need not be considered as a relevant 
course of action. It will therefore be disregarded in the following dis­
cussion. 
Applying the Wald decision criterion to this problem, it is found 
that alternative Ag guarantees that returns will be no lower than $4.59. 
Alternatives A^ and Ag cannot guarantee that returns will be higher than 
$0 or $2.10 respectively. The farmer should therefore market at 1,110 
pounds to maximize his minimum gains. 
If a Savage approach to the decision problem is adopted, the regret 
matrix of Table 22 must first be derived. From this it can be seen that 
Ag is again selected as the optimal alternative; its maximum regret of 
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Table 22. The Savage regret matrix8 
Farmer 
alter­
native NLTL NLTA NLTH 
States 
NATL 
of Nature 
NATA NATH NHTL NHTA NHTH 
A1 4.59 72.41 135.28 0 13.42 75.27 0 0 29.26 
A2 0 1.02 2.38 55.42 1.02 2.38 101.43 33.61 2.38 
A3 2.49 0 0 57.91 0 0 103.92 32.59 0 
^Minimum maximum regret, 101.43, is associated with Ag. 
$101.43 is lower than for any other course of action. Closer examination 
of Table 22 yields an interesting observation. Alternative A^> although 
selected as optimal, will leave the farmer with a regret in 8 cases out of 
9 (i.e. with 8 out of the 9 states of Nature). If each state of Nature 
is assumed equally likely, then the chance of feeling an ex post regret 
is only 4 out of 9 for alternative Ag — and the maximum regret is only 
slightly higher than that for the selected optimal alternative ($103.92 
as opposed to $101.43). Thus, if the decision maker's interests lie in 
minimizing the mental dissatisfactions or regrets that he feels when final 
ly discovering the outcomes of his decisions, might it not be better in 
some instances for him to minimize the likelihood of feeling such dis­
satisfactions? Such a suggestion appears nowhere in the literature on 
game theory, but it might be a useful variant of the Savage regret criter­
ion to consider. 
In applying the Laplace criterion, the decision maker assumes that 
an equal probability of occurrence characterizes each state of Nature. 
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If each state is here assigned a probability of l/9, the alternative having 
the highest expected return is Ag. By selling at 1,232 pounds, a long run 
return of $70.72 would be expected from each animal, higher than for any 
other considered marketing weight. 
Finally, the Hurwicz criterion selects either A2 or Ag as being 
optimal, depending on the magnitude of the decision maker's pessimism 
index. If 0 < Ot < .49, Ag has the higher a* index and to an optimistic 
decision maker it appears to offer greater opportunity for maximum returns. 
Conversely, for a more pessimistic decision maker having a value of a 
greater than 0.49, Ag would be the preferred alternative. 
As in the hog marketing problem, the nature of the decision situation 
here does not appear to allow of its consideration in a risk context. 
Objective probabilities of occurrence for the different states of Nature 
would be difficult to determine; an individual farmer, however, might 
assign his own subjective probabilities and proceed to attempt to maximize 
expected returns under what appears to him to be conditions of risk. 
From the above analysis, the results of which are summarized in Table 
23, it would seem that only two of the four farmer alternatives are worth 
Table 23. Optimal decisions concerning cattle marketing under price un­
certainty 
Farmer 
alternative Possible returns ($/head) Maximum 
selected Minimum Maximum Average regret 
Wald, Savage, A2 4.59 132.90 69.97 101.43 
Hurwicz(.49 < a < 1) 
Hurwicz(0 < a < .49) Ag 2.10 135.28 70.27 103.92 
Laplace 
Decision 
criterion 
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adopting. For conservative or pessimistic farmers, the decision to market 
at Ag (1,110 pounds) would be in line with their objectives and their 
assessment of the uncertainty situation. Optimistic farmers or those 
attempting to maximize long run returns should adopt alternative Ag and 
fatten their cattle to a weight of 1,232 pounds before selling. 
2. Comparison with actual farmer decisions 
In a random sample of farmers who were members of the Iowa Farm Busi­
ness Association in 1959, the records of 115 farms contained data on the 
number and weight of fat cattle marketed that year. Each farm was clas­
sified into one of four groups on the basis of the mean weight at which 
cattle were sold. These groups were: < 1,050 pounds, 1,051-1,200 pounds, 
1,201-1,350 pounds, and > 1,350 pounds. Within each weight class the mean 
marketing weight, weighted by the numbers each farmer sold, was computed. 
The four weighted means thus derived were 979 pounds, 1,110 pounds, 1,232 
pounds, and 1,387 pounds. As already mentioned, these were the specific 
marketing weights used to identify the four farmer alternatives in the game 
analysis. 
Marketing cattle in a given weight class implies a decision by the 
farmer to adopt one of the four alternative courses of action. The 
theoretically optimal farmer decisions, and the number of farmers in the 
sample who made each decision are shown in Table 24. 
It is obvious from these results that farmers favor the lighter 
marketing weights for cattle. This is possibly a reflection of the great 
uncertainty associated with a cattle feeding enterprise. 45.2 per cent 
of the farmers sampled sold cattle at a weight which did not satisfy any 
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Table 24. Farmer decisions concerning cattle marketing weights 
Farmer 
alternative 
Decision 
criterion 
Number of 
decisions 
Per cent 
of 
total 
Mean number 
of cattle 
sold per 
farmer 
A1 " 
979 lbs. -- 52 45.2% 87 
A2 - 1,110 lbs. Wald, Savage 
Hurwicz ( .49 <(%<!) 
49 42.6% 123 
A3 " 1,232 lbs. Laplace 
Hurwicz (0 < Ct < .49) 
12 10.5% 139 
v- 1,387 lbs. Inferior 2 
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1.7% 79 
of the formal decision criteria applied in the problem analysis. These 
farmers had smaller cattle enterprises (selling, on average, 87 fat 
cattle in that year) and perhaps felt that by feeding to higher weights 
they might incur intolerable losses if prices were unfavorable. As shown 
in the game analysis, however, their minimum possible gain would have been 
higher at the higher marketing weight of 1,110 pounds, and their expected 
or average gain higher also. But under certain states of Nature (NATL, 
NHTL, and NHTA) the returns from A% are higher than for Ag. A high sub­
jective probability of occurrence attached to these states of Nature may 
have motivated this group of 52 farmers to act as conservatively as they 
did. 
Another large group (42.6 per cent) of the decision makers studied 
marketed their cattle at a weight of 1,110 pounds. This was the alterna­
tive selected by the "conservative" decision criteria, again suggesting 
119 
caution on the part of cattle farmers in the face of price uncertainty. 
Only a relatively small number (10.5 per cent) of farmers selected alter­
native Ag, and those who did had the largest cattle enterprises of all 
the farmers studied. This result is compatible with theoretical reason­
ing, and suggests that the larger farmers may have more ability to with­
stand possible low short run returns and therefore can attempt to seek the 
highest long run returns. Two of the 115 farmers selected an alternative 
which was in all respects inferior to the other marketing weights. From 
the data available, no logical reason can be given for making this decision. 
This analysis of a cattle marketing problem is subject to the same 
criticisms as were levelled at the hog problem. Ideally the game analysis 
would relate to the prices and uncertainty at one point in time, rather 
a whole year. But as before, having information on farmer marketing 
weights in the form of whole-year averages only, it was thought more 
appropriate to use annual price data in the game analysis. It is felt, 
however, that the method of approaching the marketing problem as demon­
strated here provides a highly useful structuring of the uncertainty situ­
ation, and should enable farmers to determine more easily which is the 
best decision to make. 
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X. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Broadly speaking, an individual farmer plays a dual role in generating 
the output of his farm. First, he acts as a source of labor, providing 
one of the input factors in the production process much like any wage-
earner. Secondly, and more importantly, he acts as a manager whose 
responsibility it is to plan and superintend the operation of the farm as 
an economic unit. It is characteristic of agriculture, as well as of 
many other small business firms, that these two functions are vested in 
the one individual. It is characteristic of agriculture also, that the 
manager cannot have full control over the production process that he 
initiates. Being a biological process, agricultural production is subject 
to the influences of many natural phenomena which are either unknown, un­
predictable or uncontrollable: Seldom can the farmer be certain of the 
output he will receive from the input he applies. And when he finally 
has produced a product to sell, he cannot be sure that the price he will 
receive will cover his costs." Since he is but one of countless sellers 
in the agricultural market place, the individual farmer can exercise little 
control over prices, but must accept what the market will give. 
This, then, is the plight of the farmer. He must work, plan, organize 
and supervise. It is important that he should devote enough of his time 
and energies to his managerial tasks to ensure the continuity and success 
of the farm as a business. Any way in which managerial problems may be 
eased would allow him more peace of mind and time for other activities. 
This study has been concerned with the farmer's managerial tasks, specif­
ically with their organizational and decision making aspects, and the 
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environment within which they must be conducted. An attempt has been 
made at demonstrating how decision situations may be represented and sys­
tematically analyzed to determine that one of a series of alternative 
courses of action which best meets the farmer's objectives. 
The functions of the farmer in his capacity of a manager were first 
examined, and it was evident that the act of making decisions is of central 
importance. Prior to any action being taken a decision must be made 
* , 
selecting the appropriate action from those that are available. The 
characteristics of a decision situation were examined in detail and it 
was seen that the decision to select a particular course of action should 
be based upon the outcomes or consequences associated with that action. 
The specific outcome of any action depends upon which one of a series of 
accessory events occurs. Generally, in agricultural decision situations, 
it cannot be known in advance which event will occur. 
The decision maker is assumed to exhibit rationality in his choice 
of action. This means that he can rank the possible outcomes of his 
actions in order of his preference for them, without any inconsistencies 
or intransitivities in this ordering; and that in making his decision 
(choice) he attempts to achieve a position of maximum preference. Impor­
tant practical considerations limit any individual's ability to be 
"absolutely" rational, however. Lack of knowledge of available alterna­
tives, of relevant events, and of consequent outcomes in a given situation 
can lead to decisions which would appear to be irrational were complete 
information available. Also, in some complex situations where full 
knowledge is at hand, the computational burden imposed by an exhaustive 
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evaluation of all outcomes can deter the decision maker from trying to 
determine his ultimately optimal decision. Following the philosophy of 
Simon, it was held to be sufficient for "practical rationality" in this 
study that the decision maker consider but a representative subset of the 
decision variables in a complex situation, and attempt to optimize within 
this framework. A further assumption that had to be made here was that 
the objectives to be maximized have some direct or indirect counterpart 
in money; this assumption was necessary because of the difficulty of 
identifying a relevant utility index that is appropriate for all individ­
uals. . 
Following a discission of the decision making environment in agricul­
ture, and the degrees of imperfection of knowledge by which it may be 
characterized, various methods that farmers could adopt to cushion the 
effects of uncertainty were examined. These included systems of organiz­
ing the farm so as to make the farmer less prone to income fluctuations, 
and systems of attempting to predict the future and thus lessen the 
uncertainty. Finally, the technique of game theory was discussed as a 
means for determining optimal courses of action in a given uncertainty 
situation. 
The later chapters of this study attempted to show how game theoretic 
procedures could be used by farmers to analyze uncertainty situations 
with which they are faced, and to select a course of action appropriate 
to their position and objectives. One example considered decision of in­
put levels in circumstances where resulting output levels were uncertain; 
in this case the set of price variables was taken as given. ,A second 
example examined the problem of deciding on an output level where market 
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prices were uncertain; here there was assumed to be no uncertainty with 
respect to physical input-output relations. By a simple extension of any 
problem both types of uncertainty (that is, both yield and price) could 
be incorporated into the same analysis. 
This application of game theoretic procedures to agricultural decision 
problems was based upon two main assumptions. The first one was that 
farmers could simplify a complex decision situation by considering a rep­
resentative selection of its elements. In this way they could approach 
their optimal decision without undertaking an undesirable computational 
burden. The second assumption was that the decision makers could evaluate 
outcomes in terms of their monetary equivalents. This means that the 
objectives the farmer wished to attain were directly or indirectly related 
to net dollar returns. 
Given these assumptions, each decision situation was analyzed by 
first delineating a set of alternative courses of action open to the farmer 
in his situation. Next, a set of uncertain events, or states of Nature, 
were identified. For each farmer action, a set of outcomes could ensue, 
one corresponding to the occurrence of each state of Nature. The outcomes 
facing the farmer thus form an m by n matrix, where m is the number of 
alternative farmer actions and n the number of possible states of Nature. 
This payoff matrix, with its elements (outcomes) expressed as net monetary 
returns, provides most of the necessary information for the farmer to 
make his decision. 
There are several decision criteria which have been suggested as 
appropriate for evaluating the outcome sets in search of the optimal 
course of action. Each criterion implies different objectives or 
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psychological characteristics of the farmer. 
Hie Wald criterion evaluates the outcome sets on the basis of minimum 
values. That course of action having the largest minimum outcome is 
selected as the optimal farmer alternative. The use of such a "maximin" 
decision criterion by a farmer implies a desire to attain as high a level 
of return as possible with certainty; it suggests caution on the part of 
the farmer and a preoccupation with the short run consequences of his 
actions. He dare not attempt to achieve some higher level of return for 
fear of his returns at one period of time falling below some critical 
level. 
Another decision criterion which is rather conservative in outlook 
is the Savage minimax regret criterion. A farmer adopting this approach 
wishes to minimize the ex post dissatisfactions or regrets that he may 
feel when the final outcome of his decision becomes known. If he chose 
a course of action which did not yield the maximum return possible under 
the state of Nature which occurred, he will feel a "regret" equal to the 
difference between the returns he achieved and the (higher) returns he 
could have received. To apply this decision criterion, a regret matrix 
is derived from the original payoff matrix. The Savage criterion then 
selects that act which has the lowest maximum regret associated with it. 
It is not objectively known whether farmers actually are strongly motivated 
by desires to minimize regrets; some farmer actions (such as taking out 
. .  >  
formal insurance) may be said to satisfy such desires, however. 
In many cases, the Wald or Savage criteria may not indicate one 
single alternative as being the best. In payoff matrices having no saddle 
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point (that is, having no element which is both the minimum of its row 
and the maximum of its column) a "mixed strategy" will guarantee a higher 
level of return, or lower maximum regret, than a pure strategy. This 
means the farmer should adopt a mixture of alternatives rather than one 
single one. In the problems considered here, only pure strategies were 
relevant. 
For decision makers who are not so concerned with individual outcomes, 
the Laplace decision criterion may be appropriate. This assumes that 
each state of Nature has an equal probability of occurrence; that action 
having the highest expected value or average outcome under these assump­
tions is optimal. 
The Hurwicz criterion may be adopted by farmers who wish to let their 
optimism or pessimism guide them in their selection of an alternative. 
The decision maker attaches a weight <X to the minimum and a weight 1-a to 
the maximum outcomes possible under each alternative, and selects that 
action having the largest total of these weighted outcomes, a and 1-a 
express the level of pessimistic and optimistic feelings the decision maker 
has when viewing the uncertainty situation. 
In some instances where probabilities of occurrence may be (subjective 
ly or objectively) attached to each state of Nature, the decision problem 
may be transformed into one of decision making under risk. Every outcome 
is multiplied by its probability of occurrence, and the farmer alternative 
having the highest expected outcome is selected as being optimal. 
In the decision problems examined in this study, the above decision 
criteria were applied to determine possible optimal courses of action for 
the farmer. An optimal farmer alternative is not necessarily a unique 
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course of action in a given situation, for any alternative selected by a 
decision criterion is merely "optimal according to that criterion". Hence, 
there may be as many optimal courses of action as decision criteria 
applied. However, each farmer is assumed to adopt that decision criterion 
which is most suitable to his psychological approach to the problem and 
the objectives he has in mind. Then, the alternative selected by his 
adopted criterion must be the optimal course of action for him. 
Because several courses of action may be optimal in any uncertainty 
situation, for each decision problem analyzed a comparison was made between 
the theoretically selected alternatives and the alternatives actually 
selected by a sample of farmers in the same uncertainty situation. It 
was hoped that this might indicate what criteria farmers used in making 
decisions, and whether their actions were rational in the face of uncer­
tainty. The validity of such comparisons rests upon the satisfaction of 
two assumptions : a) that the farmers' objectives were to maximize some 
function of net monetary returns, and b) that they viewed the uncertainty 
situation in approximately the same way as it was represented in the game 
theoretic analysis. From the sample data available, there was no way of 
accurately determining whether these conditions were satisfied; in some 
instances, the results of the comparisons seemed to suggest that they were 
not. 
The first uncertainty problem analyzed was that of selecting an 
optimal level of nitrogen application to corn. The uncertainty in the 
situation related to the unknown weather conditions that might prevail, 
and the corresponding yield responses gained from the fertilizer appli­
cation. Approaching the problem as a game against Nature provided a 
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useful framework for examining the possible conditions faced by the farmer 
and identifying the main elements that might influence his decision. The 
states of Nature were the occurrence of bad, average or good weather, the 
weather conditions being measured by a "yield weather index". The farmer's 
alternative courses of action were stated in terms of a series of distinct 
levels of nitrogen application. 
For nitrogen use in northeastern Iowa, the game solutions were closely 
in accord with what intuitive reasoning might suggest. The conservative 
decision criteria -- the Wald, the Savage and the Hurwicz with high pes­
simism index — selected a zero level of nitrogen application as being -
optimal. By adopting this alternative farmers would be prepared for bad 
weather whenever it occurred. However, examination of past weather con­
ditions in this area of the state indicated that bad weather occurred, 
on the average, in only 6 years out of 20. Thus, the use of these three 
decision criteria would result in the "best" decision being made only 
three-tenths of the time. In the other 14 years, whether they were of 
average or good weather, the highest level of nitrogen application con­
sidered (80 pounds per acre) always gave highest profits. This alternative 
was optimal according to the Laplace and Hurwicz (with low pessimism index) 
criteria, and it also maximized expected returns where the situation was 
considered as one of risk. Thus, for profit maximizing farmers, an 80 
pound level of nitrogen application should be selected. Over the long 
period, profits would be higher and total regrets would be lower. However, 
this alternative has associated with it the lowest returns and the highest 
regret of any alternatives considered. This might deter many cautious 
farmers. 
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An interesting "middle of the road" approach would be to select the 
intermediate 40 pound level of nitrogen application. From examination of 
the payoff matrix for the game, this alternative appears to be the least 
"risky" of the three considered. Its minimum return is intermediate 
between that of the zero level and that of the 80 pound level of nitrogen; 
its maximum regret is only slightly higher than that of the zero level; 
and its expected or average return (whether the situation is seen as one 
of absolute uncertainty or risk) is only slightly below that of the 
80 pound level. Yet this alternative was selected only by one criterion, 
the Hurwicz with an intermediate level of optimism. 
From this discussion one might conclude that even though an individual 
farmer may not feel that a single one of the conventional criteria of 
choice exactly suits his needs, a consideration of the decision problem 
as a game against Nature allows him to present and examine the relevant 
elements of the problem in concise form. Then, from a perusal of the pos­
sible returns associated with each alternative, by weighing one against 
the other, he may select an action that best satisfies his requirements. 
Thus, the use of a game framework does not necessitate the mechanical 
application of some selected criterion, nor the rigid adherence to the 
decision suggested by it. 
The game analysis for nitrogen use on corn in southern Iowa yielded 
somewhat different results than for northeastern Iowa. For this area it 
appeared that, whatever decision criterion was adopted, some nitrogen 
should always be used. The Wald and Laplace criteria both selected the 
40 pounds per acre application rate, suggesting this level should suit 
the requirements of farmers whose concern was for either short run or 
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long run returns. The Savage criterion called for a 20 pounds per acre 
application, while a highly optimistic farmer might apply 60 pounds. Again, 
an examination of the payoff matrix and a consideration of the probabil­
ities associated with each state of Nature would enable the farmer to 
visualize the uncertainty situation he faces, and provide a framework 
within which to make his decision. He may evaluate the possible outcomes 
of each alternative nitrogen level according to some subjective criterion 
of his own. 
Comparisons of the game optimal decisions and actual farmer decisions 
suggested, in general, that farmers were not aware of the possibilities 
for higher returns from high nitrogen rates. The majority of fertilizer 
decisions were made to apply no nitrogen fertilizer; although this con­
servatism was in some sense rational in northeastern Iowa, in southern Iowa 
it was strictly sub-optimal according to the considered decision criteria. 
Either most farmers have no knowledge of the technique of fertilizer use 
on corn, or else they do not realize that returns, although uncertain and 
subject to variation, are higher in the long run when fertilizer is used. 
It is perhaps this lack of knowledge which kept nitrogen fertilizer rates 
generally low. 
This points up the need for further information to be made available 
both to farmers and researchers. Insufficient data is yet available for 
determining fully and precisely the effects of weather variations on the 
profitability of different fertilizer levels for any crop. If this were 
available, then the game matrix of payoffs could be presented to farmers 
along with estimated probabilities of occurrence for the different weather 
conditions. With this information at hand, with knowledge being conse­
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quently less imperfect, farmers could make more logical and systematic 
appraisals of their environment and arrive at more optimal and rational 
decisions. They could have greater success in conquering uncertainty 
rather than having to accept it as an unmanageable fact of life. 
To demonstrate the adaptation of game theoretic procedures to the 
determination of optimal decisions in the face of price uncertainty, two 
livestock marketing situations were considered. The problems were to 
select the best weight at which to sell fat hogs and fat cattle. At what­
ever weight he sells, the farmer does not know the exact price he will 
receive, but has some notion as to the range of prices to expect. The un­
certainty situation is compounded of the price uncertainty faced in selling 
now, coupled with uncertainty regarding future price levels if the decision 
is taken to delay marketings. Each state of Nature was thus identified 
as the occurrence of one price upon selling at the lowest weight coupled 
with the price attained if a higher marketing weight is selected instead. 
Prices were simply considered in terms of low, average and high levels 
at each marketing weight. The farmers alternatives were specified as 
possible marketing weights, and the costs of fattening livestock from 
one weight to another were assumed known. 
In the hog problem every formal decision criterion, except the Hurwicz 
with a high level of optimism, selected the selling weight of 235 pounds 
as being optimal. The implication of this result was that this weight 
should satisfy the requirements of most decision makers. However, the 
price data available differentiated only very broad weight classes; if 
prices could be obtained for smaller weight classes, and the analysis 
conducted using correspondingly less aggregated farmer alternatives, 
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slightly different conclusions may result. For instance, it might be 
found that perhaps the best marketing weight for a conservative farmer 
was somewhat lower than that for the farmer who is prepared to shoulder 
a larger risk in order to maximize long run returns. Whether this is 
actually so could not be determined here. 
The comparisons with marketing weights adopted by a sample of farmers 
showed that, overall, they closely approximated the suggested weight of 
235 pounds. Considering individuals, over 70 per cent of farmers marketed 
within the optimal weight region; about 25 per cent sold at a higher weight 
of 270 pounds, apparently motivated by a high level of optimism. A 
small fraction of farmers marketed their hogs below 200 pounds weight, 
an alternative which appeared not to satisfy any maximizing objective. 
The cattle marketing problem, conducted in similar fashion, did not 
result in the predominance of one optimal alternative. For conservative 
or pessimistic decision makers, a marketing weight of 1,110 pounds appear­
ed to be best. Where emphasis was upon maximizing long run returns, or 
the market situation was viewed with optimism, a higher weight of 1,232 
pounds was preferable. Selling at a heavier weight of 1,387 pounds always 
reduced the returns the farmer could have attained, regardless of the 
state of Nature. 
Comparing these two "acceptable" marketing weights with those adopted 
by a sample of farmers, it was found that a lower weight of 979 pounds 
was most prevalent. None of the decision criteria had selected this 
alternative, and it did not guarantee the maximum short run or long run 
return. It would.appear that cattle farmers are being overly conservative 
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in this market situation, highly uncertain though it may be. The other 
large group of decisions made by the sampled farmers was compatible with 
the adoption of a Wald, Savage or "pessimistic" Hurwicz criterion. In all, 
almost 90 per cent of the farmers acted most cautiously in selecting their 
marketing weights, preferring to sell at lower weights rather than risking 
a loss on fattening to higher levels. By acting thus, they were foregoing 
the opportunity of maximizing long run returns. 
Having demonstrated an application of game theoretic procedures to 
agricultural decision making in the face of uncertainty, what may be 
concluded from this study? 
First, the representation of uncertainty situations in the form of 
games against Nature can be a highly useful preliminary to the making of 
a decision. Very often, a large number of states of Nature and alternative 
courses of action confronts the farmer in a problem situation, making the 
payoff, matrix for the game of great size. However, beyond a certain level 
of comprehensiveness the disutility of having to engage;in complicated 
derivations and calculations exceeds the utility of the few extra dollars 
obtained from adopting the most precisely optimal course of action so 
determined. From the farmer's point of view, the essential feature is 
the simplification from the wide spectrum of uncertainty and possible 
outcomes down to a manageable level wherein the main elements of the 
problem are retained. In such a form of approximation, useful results 
can be determined which will enable the farmer to more closely approach 
an optimal action than would otherwise be possible. Although this may 
not satisfy the full conditions of a game, a sufficiently close approx­
imation to reality may still be attained. 
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With the matrix of possible returns before him, the farmer may more 
clearly see the situation by which he is faced. He can see what outcomes 
can occur, and what cannot. He may find that some alternative courses of 
action are not worth considering — that is, they may be in all respects 
inferior to the other alternatives. He can see how one alternative com­
pares with another, under any state or states of Nature which he thinks 
most likely. For decision is a subjective procedure, and although the 
decision criteria discussed here should be applied for attaining certain 
specific objectives, their application is rather mechanical and leaves 
little room for individual assessment of the situation. Undoubtedly, 
the Wald criterion is the best to apply for maximizing a minimum gain, the 
Savage criterion for minimaxing a regret, and the Laplace criterion for 
maximizing long run average returns, etc. Their use does indicate how 
certainties can be assured in an uncertain situation. But few farmers 
can be so cautious that they base their decisions solely on the maximum 
return or the minimax regret, to the exclusion of all other considerations. 
Given a decision situation in the form of a game against Nature, how 
is the farmer to select the decision criterion that is most appropriate? 
The configuration of the payoff matrix may in part suggest which type of 
criterion should perhaps be used. For instance, the Wald or Laplace 
criterion might be used when the possible loss is large and the possible 
gains are small. Conversely, if possible gains are large and possible 
losses small, then Hurwicz or Savage procedures might be adopted. But 
even so, many farmers may find that the available decision criteria do 
not fully satisfy their needs or objectives; the results they indicate 
may be too conservative, too risky, or too limited in the circumstances. 
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In this case the decision maker may wish to apply a mixture of criteria, 
or his own subjective decision criterion. For example, he may first 
determine those alternatives associated with the minimax return, maximin 
regret, and maximum average return. Then, bearing these "optimal" 
alternatives in mind, he may examine all possible outcomes associated with 
each alternative; and for each alternative he may consider the chances 
of gaining low returns in general, or the chances of feeling an ex post 
regret, or the variation in outcomes. Then his final decision can be 
based on a weighing of the certainties that he can attain in the situation 
against the uncertainties he is prepared to accept. 
However the decision is finally made, a game approach provides the 
farmer with a clear and concise presentation of the problem he faces, and 
allows a more rational consideration of alternatives. It also encourages 
a more thorough examination of decision problems through the necessary 
process of identifying farmer alternatives and states of Nature. Any 
way to increase the use of techniques of planned and methodical decision 
making in the place of unconsidered, habitual or random methods of decision 
making, would be in the interests of both the farmer and a progressive 
agricultural economy. 
Thus, it is claimed that the use of game theoretic procedures merits 
closer attention as a technique in everyday farmer decision making. This 
study has shown how this technique can be readily applied to some typical 
decision situations. The examinations of actual farmer decisions in these 
situations broadly indicate that many farmers reacted very cautiously to 
their uncertain environment; and that by reconnoitering their decision 
135 
problems in the form of a game, they might have more closely approached 
a profit maximizing course of action. Such an explorative work as this 
study is subject to many criticisms; it is therefore relevant to note the 
words of Davis (12, p. 5), who says that 
"criticism of empirical applications of the (game) theory must 
be set apart from strictures on its normative implications. 
And of course both types of argument should be distinguished 
from any attack on the abstract theory." 
Finally, there is a need for more data suitable for use in evaluating 
alternative courses of action. The results derived in the analyses in 
this study rely for their validity on the quality of the raw empirical 
data used in formulating the payoff matrices. If this data were not 
representative of the situation in which it was used, then the results 
of the problem analyses are likely to be erroneous. However, the method 
of analysis applied to the decision problems is claimed to be valid and 
highly relevant to farm decision making. If adopted by farmers, it would 
surely assist them to become more effective managers in an uncertain 
environment. 
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A. The Relation Between a Two-Person Zero-Sum Game and the 
Generalized Formulation of a Decision Problem 
From Chapter III, Section A: 
Aj^eA is one member of an action set available to the decision maker. 
Sj e S is an event outside the control of the decision maker. 
Cjj is a consequence resulting from the joint occurrence of A^ and Sj 
such that 
cij = 7<Vsj> a) 
ff is a strategy -- i.e. a function that designates an action corresponding 
to any selected event. Thus 
\ = cr(Sj) (2) 
0 is a criterion for ordering consequences. 
Let Ujj be a specific value of the criterion. Then 
Uij = 0<cij) (3) 
Hence, substituting for Cjj according to Equation 1 
uij = 0[*7(Ai,Sj)] = /(AjL.Sj) (4) 
Substituting for A% according to Equation 2 
Utj =  f [ a ( Sj),Sj] » 9(a,Sj) (5) 
Thus, U^j is determined if 0" and Sj are known, and this gives the simpli­
fied form of a two-person zero-sum game. 
The general form of this game could be obtained by defining the 
"environmental strategy", y, which determines the "environmental action" 
Sj corresponding to any action A^ of the decision maker. Thus 
Sj = *y(A^) (6) 
Substituting for A^ according to Equation 2, and for Sj according 
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to Equation 6, Equation 4 yields 
"ij -  f  <vsj> 
= /tff(Sj) ,7(^)1 (7) 
or 
U^j = X(oyy) (8) 
This would be the payoff function for a two-person zero-sum game. 
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Table 25. Corn yield weather index values, 1942-1961. 
Year ICYT District 6 ICYT District 11 
1942 129 100 
1943 104 107 
1964 124 97 
1945 111 82 
1946 94 118 
1947 74 44 
1948 120 126 
1949 85 137 
1950 74 101 
1951 82 99 
1952 97 140 
1953 84 137 
1954 110 97 
1955 95 56 
1956 80 84 
1957 110 97 
1958 98 117 
1959 102 94 
1960 96 105 
1961 114 99 
20-year average 99 102 
Table 26. Mean annual values of monthly hog prices at Chi&go, by grades (in dollars per 100 lbs.) 
< 200 lbs. 200-255 lbs. > 255 lbs. 
Year Low Average High Low Average High Low Average High 
1955 12.60 16.10 17.93 14.60 16.30 18.00 13.14 15.15 17.03 
1956 11.65 14.35 16.90 13.98 15.35 17.08 12.69 14.55 16.35 
1957 14.21 17.80 20.13 17.35 18.75 20.45 15.90 17.90 21.57 
1958 15.31 20.20 22.19 19.10 20.70 22.38 17.40 19.80 22.19 
1959 11.65 14.90 16.13 13.73 15.05 16.29 11.58 14.15 15.45 
5-year 13.08 16.67 18.66 15.75 17.23 18.84 14.14 16.31 18.52 
average 
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Table 27. Mean annual values of monthly cattle prices at Chicago, by 
grades (in dollars per 100 lbs.) 
3 1,050 lbs. 1,051-1,200 lbs. 
Year Low Average ' High Low Average High 
1954 16.10 23.25 28.56 17.50 24.45 30.04 
1955 15.13 23.85 27.42 16.13 23.05 29.00 
1956 14.50 20.75 26.71 15.69 22.40 28.00 
1957 17.02 22.25 26.35 17.96 23.40 27.99 
1958 22.08 26.40 30.00 22.61 27.15 32.67 
5-year 16.97 23.10 27.80 17.98 24.09 29.54 
average 
1,201-1,350 lbs. > 1,350 lbs. 
Low Average High Low Average High 
1954 19.38 25.35 30.36 20.70 25.70 29.40 
1955 17.19 23.60 28.85 20.09 23.65 27.13 
1956 16.63 23.25 29.12 18.35 23.60 27.70 
1957 18.79 24.15 28.31 20.88 24.50 27.96 
1958 23.31 27.90 32.81 25.27 28.10 31.81 
5-year 19.06 24.85 29.87 21.05 25.11 28.80 
average 
